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The Chief Prosecutor 
By Saikrishna Prakash* 
Since Watergate, legal scholars have participated in a larger debate 
about the President’s constitutional relationship to prosecutions.  In 
particular, many legal scholars sought to debunk the received wisdom that 
prosecution was an executive function subject to presidential control.  
Revisionist scholars cited early statutes and practices meant to demonstrate 
that early presidents lacked control over prosecution.  Among other things, 
scholars asserted that early presidents could not control either the federal 
district attorneys or the popular prosecutors who brought qui tam suits to 
enforce federal law.  In fact, many of the revisionist claims are wrong and 
others are beside the point.  Despite the lack of statutory authority over the 
district attorneys, early presidents directed the district attorneys in all sorts 
of prosecutorial matters.  As authority for their superintendence, presidents 
cited their constitutional power over law execution.  Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the statutes authorizing qui tams were meant to preclude 
presidential control over the qui tam suits.  If English practice is any 
indication, the chief executive was understood to enjoy a great deal of 
control over popular prosecutors.  Though there are many reasons to 
divorce the president from prosecution, this scheme does not have the 
imprimatur of early constitutional history.  As a matter of the 
Constitution’s original understanding, constitutional text, structure, and 
history establish that the President is the constitutional prosecutor of all 
federal offenses whether prosecuted by official or popular prosecutors. 
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Introduction 
On the evening of Saturday, October 20, 1973, Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson and then Acting Attorney General William Ruckelshaus 
resigned rather than obey President Richard Nixon’s order to fire Archibald 
Cox, the special prosecutor charged by Richardson to investigate the 
Watergate break-in.1  Acting on the advice of his predecessors, Acting 
Attorney General Robert Bork complied with Nixon’s order and fired Cox.2  
That night Nixon abolished the office of the special prosecutor and turned 
Cox’s investigation over to Justice Department personnel.3  These events 
came to be known collectively as the Saturday Night Massacre.4 
Since the Massacre, politicians and scholars have disputed how much 
 
 1 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 The Massacre was not without precedent.  President Andrew Jackson removed two 
Secretaries of Treasury when each refused his demand to remove deposits from the Bank of 
the United States.  See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR: A STUDY 
IN THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 115, 124 (1967). 
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control the president must or ought to have over prosecution of federal 
offenses.  Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of the famous Senate Select 
Committee to Investigate Campaign Practices, championed an independent 
Department of Justice, claiming that “[t]here is not one syllable in the 
Constitution that says that Congress cannot make the Justice Department 
independent of the President.”5  On NBC’s Meet the Press, presidential 
candidate Jimmy Carter actually pledged to establish an independent 
Department of Justice, complete with an attorney general with a term 
longer than the president’s.6 
In a statement submitted to Chairman Ervin’s Senate Judiciary 
Committee, former special prosecutor Archibald Cox opposed Ervin’s 
legislation as unconstitutional because it deprived the president of removal 
authority over executive officers.  He also doubted the constitutionality of 
vesting in officials independent of the president “a very large part of the 
duty . . . ‘to take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ . . . .  Civil suits 
and criminal prosecutions are major weapons in the execution of the 
laws.”7  Columbia Law Professor Herbert Wechsler agreed, noting that he 
did not see how the president could be held accountable for faithful law 
execution if the function of law execution would be vested in officers 
independent of the president.8 
Although such drastic measures went nowhere, in 1978 Congress 
enacted the historic, though more modest, Ethics in Government Act. 9  The 
Act required the attorney general to seek the appointment of an 
independent counsel whenever there was specific and credible evidence 
that high-level executive branch officials may have violated the law.10  
While the attorney general could remove the independent counsel, the Act 
limited the grounds of removal.11  Under the Act, almost two dozen 
 
 5 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2803 and S. 
2978, 93rd Cong. 3 (1974). 
 6 GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 28 (1982) 
(describing events surrounding the broadcast in 1976).  Once Carter took office, his 
Department of Justice told him that an independent Department of Justice would be 
unconstitutional.  Id. 
 7 Supra note 5, at 208. 
 8 Id. at 336.  As the hearing report reveals, scholars and politicians were on both 
sides of this issue. 
 9 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. 
 10 28 U.S.C. §§ 591(d), 592(c) (2000). 
 11 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (2000) (providing that attorney general may remove 
independent counsel only for good cause, physical or mental disability).  The original 
version of the Act provided that the counsel could be removed for “extraordinary 
impropriety.”  Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. at 1872.  Some members of Congress felt 
that this change would enhance the constitutionality of the statute.  See S. REP. NO. 97-496, 
at 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3553.  John Manning has suggested that 
the independent counsel statute’s “for cause” removal restrictions were best read to permit 
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independent counsels have investigated dozens of senior executive branch 
officials.12 
Perhaps the most famous critic of the independent counsel framework 
was Theodore Olson, now the Bush administration’s solicitor general.13 
When independent counsel Alexia Morrison served him with a subpoena, 
Olson challenged the constitutionality of the independent counsel.14  
Although successful before the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court rebuffed 
Olson’s claims that the Act violated the Appointments Clause, the 
limitations of Article III, and the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers.15  In a lone dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia denounced the majority.  
Seizing on the Court’s concession that prosecution was an executive 
function, Scalia asked: “In what other sense can one identify ‘the executive 
Power’ that is supposed to be vested in the President . . . except by 
reference to what has always and everywhere—if conducted by 
government at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never by the 
courts, and always by the executive.”16  Because criminal investigation and 
prosecution were “quintessentially” executive functions and because the 
counsel was independent of the president, Scalia reasoned that the Act 
unconstitutionally transferred a portion of the president’s executive power 
to the independent counsel.17 
In the wake of Morrison, respected scholars such as William Gwyn, 
 
the president to remove when the counsel defied presidential orders.  John F. Manning, The 
Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1285, 1288 (1999).  If Manning is correct, the independent counsel was not so 
independent after all. 
 12 MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE ROLES OF 
INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, INSPECTORS GENERAL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS 2-3 (1998) (noting that at least twenty-one independent counsels were named 
between 1979 and 1998), 
http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/natl_commissions/past_commissions/comm_1998.
pdf. 
 13 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  Olson was hardly alone in criticizing 
the Act.  It is probably fair to say that some critic somewhere has charged each of the 
independent counsels with squandering public funds, moving at a subglacial pace, or 
grinding partisan axes.  Samuel Dash, Independent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal 
Prosecutor, 86 GEO. L.J. 2077, 2083 (1998) (describing inevitable scrutiny of independent 
counsels by the media).  Furthering the circus like atmosphere, the critics of independent 
counsels have themselves been condemned as attempting to impede counsel investigations 
by bringing counsels into disrepute.  See AllPolitics, Carville To Wait, Watch Starr, at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/9612/06/carville/index.shtml (Dec. 6, 1996) 
(quoting Senator Trent Lott as calling James Carville’s attacks on independent counsel 
Kenneth Starr as “out of order”).  Hence executive branch scandals often begat scandals 
related to the conduct of the independent counsels. 
 14 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 668. 
 15 Id. at 660. 
 16 Id. at 706. 
 17 Id. 
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Harold Krent, Lawrence Lessig, Cass Sunstein, and many others cast doubt 
on the notion that prosecution was an executive function.18  Rather than 
merely defending the notion that the Ethics in Government Act’s particular 
restrictions on executive control did not impermissibly infringe upon the 
president’s executive power, such scholars went further, suggesting that as 
a historical matter, prosecution was not an executive function at all.  First, 
scholars asserted that federal district attorneys were not subject to 
centralized, executive control until the late 19th century.19  Second, some 
asserted that 19th century state attorneys prosecuted federal offenses, 
independent of the president.20  Third, scholars observed that early 
Congresses, through the creation of “popular-actions,”21 had repeatedly 
granted the public the right to prosecute alleged violators on behalf of the 
federal government.22.  Finally, at least one scholar suggested that 
 
 18 Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional 
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 563 (1989); 
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 476 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal 
Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 15-16 (1994); Daniel N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of 
Powers Jurisprudence: The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REV. 49, 56-60 (1988); 
Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson 
and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070 (1990).  Of course, there have been many 
who have been critical of the decision in Morrison v. Olson and have argued in favor of 
presidential control of prosecution.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel 
Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic 
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225; 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701 
(2003).  None of these prior treatments thoroughly examined the original understanding of 
prosecutorial control. 
 19 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16; Dangel, supra note 18, at 1085. 
 20 Krent, supra note 18, at 304-08; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 19-20. 
 21 The article uses the phrases “popular actions” and “popular prosecutions” to refer to 
suits that may be brought by anyone on behalf of the government to recover fines and 
forfeitures.  Popular actions can be divided into two subcategories: qui tam actions and 
informations.  Qui tams were pursued by a civil action for debt while informations involved 
a criminal proceeding.  See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *160 (discussing qui tam actions); 4 id. at *303-04 (discussing informations).  
Typically, the popular prosecutor would receive a portion of any recovery with the 
remainder going to the state.  Id. 
 22 See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui tam Actions, 99 YALE 
L.J. 341, 341 (1989); Krent, supra note 18, at 296-303.  Many have defended the 
constitutionality of popular actions.  See generally Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional 
Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381 (2001); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and 
the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939 (2002); Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of 
5
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prosecution was at least as much a judicial function as it was an executive 
one, evidenced by the close relationship of prosecutors and courts and the 
judicial appointment of prosecutors in early state constitutions.23  These 
early practices and understandings led some scholars to conclude that 
nothing in the Constitution requires that the president control prosecution.24 
Notwithstanding the vigorous scholarly defense of the constitutionality 
of prosecutorial independence, Congress failed to reauthorize the 
independent counsel provisions, thereby interring the independent 
counsel.25  In the wake of Kenneth Starr’s investigation of several Clinton-
era scandals, a bipartisan consensus emerged against the use of independent 
counsels.  For years, many Republicans had decried the law as 
unconstitutional, and the Clinton experience had left many of the 
independent counsel’s Democratic supporters queasy (especially President 
Clinton). 
But like a ghoul, the idea of divorcing prosecution from the president 
will not rest in peace.  Late in 2003, in the aftermath of allegations that 
senior White House staff had illegally exposed the cover of a CIA agent, 
Senators Joseph Lieberman and Carl Levin introduced a “new and 
improved” independent counsel statute.26  Given that the executive and 
legislative branches were controlled by the same party, the proposal had 
little chance of success.27  Nonetheless, because members of Congress 
 
Powers Challenges “Take Care” of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, 
Private “Enforcers,” and Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (2001); 
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in 
the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000); Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s 
Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims 
Act, 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (1997); Steven L. Winter, What If Justice Scalia Took 
History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2001).  As one 
might expect, many others have argued against the constitutionality of popular actions.  See 
generally Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in 
Civil Disguise, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 472 (2003); James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality 
of the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701 (1993); 
Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment, “Missing the Analytical Boat”: The Unconstitutionality of 
the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 319 (1990); Kathryn 
Feola, Comment, Bad Habits: The Qui tam Provisions of the False Claims Act Are 
Unconstitutional Under Article II, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL’Y 151 (2002); Ara 
Lovitt, Note, Fight for Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and the President, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 853 (1997). 
 23 Gwyn, supra note 18, at 502. 
 24 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 70; Krent, supra note 18, at 281. 
 25 By not renewing the independent counsel provisions, Congress allowed the 
independent counsel provisions to expire in 1999.  See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2000) (providing 
that independent counsel provisions would cease to be effective five years after the date of 
the enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994). . 
 26 See Independent Counsel Reform Act of 2003, S. 1712, 108th Cong. 
 27 At the time of publication of this article, the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
was reviewing Senator Lieberman’s bill. 
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often grasp for solutions in the wake of scandals, Senator Lieberman’s 
proposal might be a major scandal or two away from enactment. 
When the political tides turn, there seems little that will bar the 
resuscitation of the independent counsel concept.  Opportunistic members 
of Congress might even dust off Senator Ervin’s idea of an independent 
Department of Justice.28  Though the Supreme Court might now quibble 
with the appointment of independent counsels, its doctrine suggests that 
Congress can do much to isolate prosecution from presidential control.29  
Moreover, most of the existing scholarship examining original practices 
contends that early presidents quite clearly lacked constitutional authority 
to direct prosecution of offenses against the United States.  Instead, early 
presidents only had as much authority over prosecution as Congress 
bestowed upon them.  So long as reasonable people see the wisdom in 
divorcing politics from prosecution, the idea of divorcing the president 
from prosecutions will continue to haunt us. 
It is time to drive a stake in the heart of the idea that independent 
prosecutors (of whatever sort) have the imprimatur of history.  Historical 
claims advanced by academics about the insulation of federal prosecution 
from presidential control are largely wrong, in some cases profoundly so.  
There is ample proof that in 1789 the executive power encompassed the 
authority to prosecute those who (allegedly) violated the law.30  For 
instance, William Blackstone repeatedly described the King as the proper 
prosecutor of all public offenses because the public had charged the King 
with executing the law.31  Hence, it is not surprising that the English Crown 
could control prosecutors as could its royal governors in America.  Though 
they were quite feeble in several respects, the early state executives 
likewise directed state attorneys.  This was the lay of the land when the 
founders created the presidency. 
Under the new Constitution, Presidents Washington, Adams, and 
Jefferson routinely and publicly directed district attorneys and the attorneys 
general to start and stop prosecutions.32  Because no federal statute ever 
authorized presidential superintendence, the Constitution itself must have 
been read to authorize presidential direction.  Indeed, presidents cited the 
Constitution as authorizing their control.  Speaking of the district attorneys, 
 
 28 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 29 Edmond v. United States, a 1997 Appointments Clause decision, departed from 
Morrison’s balancing approach and articulated a bright-line test for determining whether an 
officer is inferior.  See 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997).  This led some to contend that 
Morrison’s conclusion that the independent counsel was an inferior officer is no longer 
good law.  See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New 
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1998). 
 30 See infra Part II.C. 
 31 See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra Part II.C.4. 
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Jefferson said that because the president was to have the laws executed, he 
could “order an offence then to be prosecuted.  If he sees a prosecution put 
into a train which is not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued and put 
into a legal train . . . .  There appears to be no weak part in any of these 
positions or inferences.”33  Jefferson was hardly alone in his conclusions.  
In the republic’s early years there appears to have been something of a 
bipartisan, tribranch consensus that the chief executive could control 
official prosecutors and their prosecutions. 
Though the arguments are not as conclusive, the Constitution is 
likewise best read as permitting the president to control popular actions 
brought by private citizens.  Whatever a statute might provide, the 
Constitution’s grant of the executive power34 makes the president the 
“Constitutional Executor”35 of federal laws.  Because popular actions 
enforce the law, the president must be able to exercise some control over 
them.  Otherwise, contrary to the Article II Vesting Clause, each popular 
prosecutor would enjoy a portion of the executive power and the result 
would be an unruly executive horde, with each member of the public 
empowered to pursue his or her own law enforcement policies and 
strategies.  Independent popular actions, where individuals may prosecute 
violations of federal law without any executive control, make everyone a 
chief executive, something the Constitution does not permit. 
The point is not that the president’s executive power forbids the 
harnessing of private greed to enforce the law.  To the contrary, if the 
president exercises ultimate control over popular actions—by retaining 
authority to discontinue them—the grant of executive power poses no 
constitutional difficulty to the creation of popular actions.  In other words, 
while independent popular actions are likely unconstitutional, terminable 
popular prosecutions (popular actions that the president may halt) may not 
be constitutionally problematic at all. 
History points in the same direction.  The English chief executive had 
broad (but not unbounded) power to terminate popular actions.  Nothing in 
early American history suggests that the United States chief executive had 
less control over popular prosecutors.  Although scholars have asserted that 
early presidents could not intervene in popular actions, no federal statute 
authorizing popular prosecutions ever barred executive control.  In fact, 
later Supreme Court cases suggested that the president could pardon those 
popularly prosecuted, thereby precluding the popular prosecutor’s receipt 
of any share of the fine or forfeiture.  Far from demonstrating that 
 
 33 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 57 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1897). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“Eexecutive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States.”). 
 35 4 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 444 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). 
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independent popular actions are constitutional, history actually suggests 
that the president’s grant of executive power enables him to terminate 
popular prosecutions.36 
Part I observes that Congress has created numerous pockets of 
prosecutorial independence and also recounts how scholars have 
challenged the judiciary’s longstanding view that prosecution is an 
executive function.  Part II claims that, as a matter of the Constitution’s 
original understanding, the president may direct “official prosecutions,” 
i.e., federal prosecutions brought by officers or employees of the federal or 
state governments.  Finally, Part III contends that, while independent 
popular actions are unconstitutional, terminable popular prosecutions do 
not violate the president’s executive power.  Taken together, Parts II and III 
advance the claim that the president is the chief prosecutor, i.e., the 
constitutional prosecutor of all offenses against the United States.37 
Because there are many sound reasons to favor prosecutorial 
independence, there will undoubtedly be those who continue to see the 
wisdom in insulating prosecutions from the president.  To the extent that 
some scholars and judges believe that history supports the constitutionality 
of prosecutorial independence, however, this Article supplies a needed 
corrective.  If people persist in advocating independent prosecutors, an 
autonomous attorney general, or an independent Department of Justice, 
 
 36 The constitutionality of popular actions remains an open question.  In Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Supreme Court pointedly 
noted that its conclusion that qui tam relators had standing left open the question of whether 
qui tams actions might nonetheless violate the Appointments and Faithful Execution 
Cclauses.  See 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000).  Curiously, the Court did not mention the 
possibility that qui tam provisions might violate the president’s executive power. 
 37 The Article does not address suits brought by private parties to vindicate their own 
private rights.  More importantly, the Article does not discuss when Congress must provide 
for government enforcement of the law.  The Article only asserts that when Congress 
decides that the United States has an interest in enforcing a particular law, as evidenced by 
Congress’s decision to require governmental execution of that law, the president may 
control all suits brought on behalf of the United States to enforce that law.  Whenever a 
government official or a private party sues on behalf of the United States, the Constitution 
grants the president control of that suit.  Accordingly, the Article does not consider the 
constitutionality of statutes that try to supplement governmental enforcement of laws with 
private enforcement, through the creation of new private rights and causes of action.  While 
the grant of the executive power may limit or bar congressional attempts to create private 
rights when the actual congressional goal is to bypass sluggish executive branch law 
enforcement, this Article takes no position on this matter.  Likewise, the article does not 
address the constitutionality of criminal appeals of felony whereby private parties criminally 
prosecuted those who had injured them.  Blackstone regarded this mode of prosecution as 
largely outdated.  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *312-13.  Moreover, the 
criminal appeal apparently never found its way into the United States Code.  Young v. 
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 817 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (observing that he was unaware of any law authorizing criminal appeals). 
9
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they must do so without the imprimatur of early constitutional history.38 
I. The Enduring Dispute About Presidential Power Over Prosecution 
Federal judges consistently have viewed prosecution as an executive 
function.  In Morrison itself, Justice Scalia and Judge Laurence Silberman 
claimed that the president must be able to control prosecutions.39  In the 
same case, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and then Judge Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg seemed to admit the executive nature of prosecutions.40  Prior 
case law amply reflects this consensus about the executive nature of 
prosecution. 
Citing historical practices, academics have disparaged the assertion 
that the Constitution authorizes presidential control of prosecution.41  Some 
have argued that even if prosecution is an executive function, Congress 
may insulate prosecution from presidential control.42  Others have 
maintained that prosecution is as much a judicial function as it is an 
executive function.43 
Well before this debate intensified, Congress made select areas of civil 
prosecution largely independent of the president.  Congress may have 
begun this trend as early as 1887, when it passed the Interstate Commerce 
Act.44  The Act seemingly created an independent Interstate Commerce 
 
 38 The Article’s principle claim is that the Constitution’s grant of executive power 
enables the president to control prosecutions.  Though the Article also contends that the 
Congress cannot curb the president’s constitutional control over prosecution (or law 
execution generally), early constitutional history sheds little light on this matter.  Early 
federal statutes never purported to constrain presidential control.  Instead, they were read 
against the background presumption that the Constitution authorized presidential direction 
of official prosecutors.  Because the issue of congressional constraints on presidential 
control never apparently arose, it was never considered, much less resolved.  Given that this 
question never arose, no one can cite early constitutional history to either support or refute 
the notion that Congress can abridge the chief prosecutor’s constitutionally-authorized 
control of prosecutions.  Nonetheless, since Congress does not have the generic authority 
(under the Necessary and Proper Clause or any other clause) to treat the Constitution’s 
allocation of powers as default rules, this Article contends that Congress cannot limit the 
president’s powers over prosecutions.  The president’s constitutionally granted powers are 
not mere default rules that Congress may modify as it wishes. 
 39 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting); In Re Sealed Case, 
838 F.2d 476, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, J.). 
 40 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696 (Rehnquist, J.); In Re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 519 
(Ginsburg, R. B., J., dissenting). 
 41 See supra note 18. 
 42 Krent, supra note 18, at 279-81; Dangel, supra note 18, at 1070-71. 
 43 Gwyn, supra note 18, at 492-93. 
 44 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.).  Chris Yoo, Steve Calabresi, and Laurance Nee have argued that 
given the rule of construction announced in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903), 
statutes like the Interstate Commerce Act would not have been understood to limit the 
president’s constitutional removal authority in the early twentieth century.  See Christopher 
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Commission and commanded district attorneys to prosecute whenever the 
Commission filed an enforcement petition.45  Today, while independent 
litigating authority is the exception rather than the rule, a number of 
independent agencies litigate free of executive branch control.46  Moreover, 
a few federal statutes create popular actions that arguably grant members of 
the public a measure of autonomy in bringing suits.47  The Article briefly 
considers this status quo before recounting the claims made by courts and 
scholars 
A. The Prosecutorial Status Quo 
The default rule is that the Department of Justice, under the attorney 
general’s direction, represents the United States in court.48  With respect to 
criminal prosecutions, the Department of Justice has exercised such control 
since 1870.49  While many government agencies may investigate crimes, if 
an agency desires a criminal prosecution, it must refer the case to the 
Justice Department.50  While the Justice Department typically criminally 
prosecutes only if there is an agency referral, the Department need not 
secure a referral prior to commencing a criminal prosecution.51  In effect, 
 
S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2004).  In Shurtleff, the Court said that even if Congress could limit 
the president’s removal authority, it would have to do so by “very clear and explicit 
language.”  Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 315.  If these scholars are right and the president (and his 
lawyers) were cognizant of Shurtleff’s proexecutive rule of construction, then Interstate 
Commerce Commissioners might not have been as independent as many have supposed. 
 45 Interstate Commerce Act § 16. 
 46 Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-64 (1994). 
 47 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765 (2000), the Court claimed that there were but four extant popular action statutes, each of 
which was over a century old.  Id. at 768 n.1.  The most important is the False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).  See also 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (providing cause of action 
and share of recovery against a person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292 
(2000) (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking 
patented articles).  Congress, however, has subsequently repealed the popular action 
provision of one statute cited by the Court.  See Indian Tribal Economic Development and 
Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179 § 2 (repealing popular action 
provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 81).  The Court also cited other provisions that do not clearly 
grant informers a right to bring suit.  See 18 U.S.C. § 962 (2000) (providing for forfeiture to 
informer of share of vessels privately armed against friendly nations, but not expressly 
authorizing suit by informer); 46 U.S.C. § 723 (2000) (providing for forfeiture to informer 
of share of vessels removing undersea treasure from the Florida coast to foreign nations, but 
not expressly authorizing suit by informer). 
 48 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000). 
 49 An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, §§ 5, 16, 16 Stat. 162, 162-
64 (1870). 
 50 Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control 
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 561 (2003). 
 51 Id. 
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the Justice Department has had a century plus monopoly on criminal 
prosecutions.  Other agencies may assist in various ways, but they cannot 
direct or preclude criminal prosecutions. 
As noted, there were notable exceptions to this monopoly.  Under the 
now-defunct independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government 
Act, independent counsels could prosecute alleged criminal violations 
committed by senior executive branch officials without the leave or control 
of the Department of Justice.52  Indeed, the Act barred the Department (and 
the executive branch more generally) from pursuing matters within the 
independent counsel’s jurisdiction.53  In effect, each independent counsel 
had her own narrow monopoly. 
With respect to civil law enforcement, Congress has created numerous 
pockets of prosecutorial independence.  Some independent agencies, such 
as the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), can litigate all agency related 
civil matters in all federal courts;54 the Department of Justice plays no 
formal role in FEC litigation.  Others, like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), can prosecute all agency matters in all courts, save 
the Supreme Court.55  And still others, like the Federal Communication 
Commission, can prosecute some agency matters in some federal courts.56 
While presidents appoint the commissioners of the independent 
agencies, the underlying statutes are typically read to preclude presidential 
control of the agencys’ actions, including their prosecutorial decisions.  
Though some presidents have taken fitful steps to curb the decentralization 
of civil prosecutorial authority (by threatening vetoes of new decentralizing 
statutes),57 none have asserted the right to control all official prosecutions. 
Besides creating pockets of independent official prosecutions, 
Congress also has authorized “popular actions” that grant members of the 
public the right to prosecute on behalf of the government.  While these 
actions have an ancient pedigree, there are currently only three remaining 
in the United States Code, and Congress has not created any new popular 
actions in over 130 years.58  The most well known of the popular actions 
are the civil qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.59  Congress 
authorized any person to prosecute a civil fraud—in the name of the United 
States—against any person who allegedly makes a false claim to the United 
States government.60  If the prosecution is successful, the so called qui tam 
 
 52 28 U.S.C. § 594(a), (i) (2000). 
 53 28 U.S.C. § 597(a) (2000). 
 54 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c, d (2000); Devins, supra note 46, at 275 n.101. 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2000); Devins, supra note 46,  at 278-79 n.125. 
 56 Devins, supra note 46, at 264. 
 57 Id. at 267-68. 
 58 See supra note 47. 
 59 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). 
 60 Id. § 3730(b). 
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relator receives up to thirty percent of any damages and penalties 
recovered, with the United States Treasury receiving the remainder.61 
In sum, though the executive branch currently enjoys a monopoly on 
federal criminal prosecutions, it lacks similar control over civil 
prosecutions.  With respect to civil prosecutions, Congress has created two 
types of exceptions to the general rule of executive branch control..  First, 
in some areas of civil law enforcement, the executive branch either has no 
civil prosecutorial jurisdiction at all (such as under the federal election 
laws) or has sharply curtailed jurisdiction because independent agencies 
have virtually all prosecutorial authority (such as civil prosecutions under 
the federal securities laws).  Second, in a handful of civil law enforcement 
matters (such as enforcement of the False Claims Act), the executive 
branch and the general public have concurrent authority. 
B. A Longstanding Judicial Consensus About the Executive Nature of 
Prosecution 
In Morrison v. Olson, all Justices agreed that prosecution was an 
executive function.62  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
noted that “[t]here is no real dispute that functions performed by the 
independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law 
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials 
within the Executive Branch.”63  The majority also agreed that the 
independent counsel was an executive officer.64  Justice Scalia concurred: 
“Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially 
executive function” and the virtual embodiment of the power to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.65 
In the D.C. Circuit, there was a surprising consensus as well.  Writing 
for the majority, Judge Laurence Silberman claimed that “the Constitution 
vests the power to initiate a criminal prosecution exclusively in the 
Executive Branch; this power is encompassed within the Executive’s power 
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”66  Largely agreeing, 
then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that although prosecution was not a 
“core” executive function, it nonetheless was “indisputably an executive 
task.”67 
In reaching these conclusions, the Justices and judges were merely 
reiterating what their predecessors had been saying for well over two 
 
 61 Id. § 3730(d)(2). 
 62 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id. at 691. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 706. 
 66 In Re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 67 Id. at 526 (Ginsburg, R.B., J., dissenting). 
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centuries.  In United States v. Nixon,68 the Court noted that “the Executive 
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to 
prosecute a case.”69  Over a century earlier, in United States v. Phillips,70 
the Court dismissed a case after being informed by the attorney general that 
the district attorney had entered a nolle prosequi71 at the direction of the 
president.72  Almost two centuries ago, in the famous case of United States 
v. Burr,73 Chief Justice John Marshall criticized the Jefferson 
administration’s slow handling of the Burr trial and noted that “[t]o the 
executive government is intrusted the important power of prosecuting those 
whose crimes may disturb the public repose or endanger its safety.”74  
More examples are not wanting.75 
To be sure, in Morrison there was a profound difference of opinion 
about what the executive nature of prosecutions meant for the 
constitutionality of independent prosecutors.  Constrained by Supreme 
Court precedent, Judge Silberman could not merely conclude that, because 
prosecution was an executive function, any attempts to insulate prosecution 
from presidential direction were unconstitutional.76  By virtue of his 
position as a Supreme Court justice, Justice Scalia was permitted to go 
further, arguing that once one determined that prosecution was an executive 
function, any attempt to render it independent of the president was 
unconstitutional as an abridgement of the president’s executive power.77 
Clearly, the Morrison majority and Judge Ginsburg did not find the 
executive nature of prosecutions dispositive as to the constitutionality of 
the independent counsel position.  Instead, they asked whether the statute 
 
 68 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 69 Id. at 693. 
 70 United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S. 776 (1832). 
 71 A nolle prosequi, also known as a nol-pros, is an entry made on the record whereby 
a prosecutor declines to continue with the case.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1070 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 72 Phillips, 31 U.S. at 776; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) 
(stating that a decision not to indict “has long been regarded as the special province of the 
Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”). 
 73 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Va. 1806) (No. 14,692). 
 74 Id. at 15. 
 75 United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1642 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(describing prosecution as a quintessential executive task); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
1002 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to prosecutions as an “inherently executive 
function”); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (describing the attorney general as 
“the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in protection of 
the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be 
faithfully executed”). 
 76 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 526 (1988). 
 77 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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excessively constrained or interfered with the executive power.78  Given the 
political circumstances—widespread concerns about presidential self-
dealing going back for more than a decade and a seemingly narrow 
diminution of executive control of prosecutions—there was little truly 
surprising in the Court’s decision to uphold the Act’s constraints on 
executive power.79 
C. The Scholarly Revisionists 
In the wake of Morrison’s unanimity that prosecution was an 
executive function, scholars assumed their traditional (and constructive) 
role of judicial gadflies.  Respected scholars such as William Gwyn, Harold 
Krent, Cass Sunstein, Larry Lessig, and many others recounted history in 
an attempt to show that at the founding, presidents had little or no control 
over federal prosecutions.80  In fact, early Congresses supposedly ensured 
that no one enjoyed centralized prosecutorial control. 
First, there was no Department of Justice (or Department of 
Prosecutions) because early Congresses never created a hierarchical, 
executive department in charge of prosecutions.  Instead, the structure of 
the Judiciary Act of 178981 supposedly ensured that no one entity could 
control official prosecution.  The Act charged individual district attorneys 
with prosecuting in their districts “all delinquents for crimes and offences, 
cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in 
which the United States shall be concerned.”82  The Act also required the 
attorney general to provide advice to the president and heads of 
departments and to represent the United States in the Supreme Court.83 
In contrast with language found in the organic acts establishing the 
Departments of Foreign Affairs and War, neither the attorney general nor 
the district attorneys were labeled executive.84  Likewise, in contrast to his 
power over the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs, the president lacked 
statutory authority to direct or remove either the attorney general or the 
district attorneys.85  Early attorneys general similarly lacked statutory 
 
 78 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-91; In Re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 530 (Ginsburg, R.B., 
J., dissenting). 
 79 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; In Re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 530 (Ginsburg, R.B., J., 
dissenting). 
 80 See supra note 18. 
 81 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 82 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. at 92. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Bloch, supra note 18, at 569-70. 
 85 Id. at 579-81.  Susan Low Bloch argues that Congress regarded the attorney general 
as the Congress’s lawyer as much as the president’s.  Id. at 581-82.  For instance, the 
Congress sometimes directed the attorney general to make reports to Congress.  Id.  On one 
occasion, Congress even directed him to prosecute a suit.  Id. at 581-82. 
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authority to direct the district attorneys.86  Indeed, although Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph sought such power in 1791,87 Congress waited 
until 1861 to confer such control.88  Because apparently no one could direct 
the district attorneys, the district attorneys were free agents.89 
Said to be equally damaging to the view that the president could 
control prosecution is the fact that state prosecutors also prosecuted federal 
crimes.90  Though Congress never specified that state prosecutors could 
prosecute violations of federal law, Congress permitted the state courts to 
hear cases involving federal criminal law. 91  State prosecutors apparently 
took this to mean that they could prosecute violations of federal law.92  
Such prosecutors “were far removed from control of the [federal] executive 
branch”93 for the simple reason that the president could not remove them 
from office.  The president lacked authority to dismiss any state officials, 
including state prosecutors. 
Another supposed difficulty with the chief prosecutor theory is that 
early Congresses established numerous popular actions.94  These 
Congresses enacted popular actions that granted a portion of a fine or 
forfeiture to a successful popular prosecutor who sued on behalf of the 
United States (and on behalf of themselves) to recover fines and forfeitures 
due the United States.  The president surely could not control these private 
citizens because they were not part of the executive branch at all.  
Moreover, because the underlying statutes established criminal offenses, a 
popular prosecution was generally understood to preclude a subsequent 
official prosecution.95  In other words, by beating the government 
prosecutor to the courthouse, the informer or qui tam relator could preclude 
subsequent government prosecution of any criminal offense.96 
William Gwyn supplied what seemed the coup de grace for the Chief 
Prosecutor theory, claiming “that there are no good reasons for considering 
criminal prosecutions as purely ‘executive’ in character.”97  First, Gwyn 
claimed that the Constitution nowhere specified that prosecution was an 
executive task and claimed that no constitutional history supported that 
 
 86 Id. at 567-68. 
 87 Id. at 585-87. 
 88 Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. 
 89 Krent, supra note 18, at 286-90; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16-18; 
Dangel, supra note 18, at 1086. 
 90 Krent, supra note 18, at 309. 
 91 Id. at 307. 
 92 Id. at 306, nn.152-53. 
 93 Id. at 303. 
 94 Id. at 302-03. 
 95 Krent, supra note 18, at 300. 
 96 Id. at 301. 
 97 Gwyn, supra note 18, at 491. 
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view.98  Second, Gwyn cited history that purportedly suggested that early 
Congresses regarded prosecution as a judicial function.99  In particular, 
Congress created the district attorneys and the attorney general in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789—an Act to establish the judicial courts of the United 
States.100  Gwyn believed that this suggested that prosecution was closely 
associated with judicial power in the minds of congressmen.101  Seeming to 
confirm his intuition, an early draft of the Judiciary Act would have vested 
appointment of the attorney general and the district attorneys with the 
federal courts rather than with the president.102  If prosecution was truly an 
executive activity, this proposed appointment mechanism would have made 
no sense, argued Gwyn.  Third, Gwyn noted that modern state constitutions 
often established attorneys general and prosecutors in (or immediately 
after) the article establishing a judiciary.103  Finally, Gwyn noted that, to 
this day, governors typically lack control of prosecution and that many 
individuals continue to regard prosecutors as judicial (rather than 
executive) officers.104  In the end, however, Gwyn did not wish to 
pigeonhole prosecution as either judicial or executive.  He thought it 
“[m]ore sensible” to regard prosecution as both executive and judicial.105 
According to the revisionist scholars, their historical scholarship 
devastated the traditional view of prosecution as an executive function.  
Congress’s control over prosecutions seemed far-reaching, with the powers 
to create independent federal prosecutors, to vest prosecutorial authority 
with state prosecutors independent of the president, and to empower 
millions of independent, popular prosecutors.  On top of all this, Professor 
Gwyn claimed that prosecution was just as much a judicial function as it 
was an executive one.  To the revisionist scholars, it seemed well nigh 
conclusive that the conventional view about prosecution was mistaken. 
In fact, the revisionist scholars’ claims are often wrong or beside the 
point.  Revisionist scholars have erroneously assumed that early federal 
statutes implicitly barred presidential control of prosecutions.  As we shall 
see, early presidents (and many others) in the early years came to the exact 
opposite conclusion.  Since the statutes said nothing about presidential 
control of prosecution and because prosecutions concerned law 
execution—something constitutionally committed to the president—the 
president had constitutional authority to control prosecutions. 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 492-93. 
 100 Id. at 493. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 494-95. 
 104 Id. at 495-97. 
 105 Id. at 502. 
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II. Presidential Control of Official Prosecutions 
Revisionists typically say little about constitutional text and structure, 
preferring to make historical cases for denying that the president may 
control prosecution.  Some assert that the Constitution apparently does not 
discuss prosecution.106  Others claim that because provisions like the 
Executive Power Clause have no obvious meaning, we have no way of 
knowing what the Constitution might say about prosecution.107 
If revisionists make further textual claims, they sometimes cite three 
clauses said to cast doubt on the chief prosecutor thesis: the Faithful 
Execution Clause,108 the pardon power,109 and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.110  The Faithful Execution Clause supposedly requires the president 
to abide by whatever prosecutorial system Congress enacts, including a 
system of independent prosecutors.  The pardon power purportedly exists 
precisely because the president does not control prosecutions.  The pardon 
power gives him a measure of control over prosecutions that he would 
otherwise lack.  The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to 
enact laws to carry into execution its legislative powers, including the 
ability to create independent prosecutors, or so it is said. 
Revisionist scholars have been too hasty in concluding that text and 
structure have little to say about prosecution.  Properly understood, text and 
structure indicate that the president may control official prosecutions.  The 
Constitution’s grant of executive power means that the president may 
control law execution, including prosecutions of alleged law breakers.  The 
Faithful Execution Clause, by imposing a duty about how the president 
must use his executive power, helps confirm that the president can 
prosecute alleged offenders and thereby set the wheels of justice in motion.  
Neither the pardon power nor the Necessary and Proper Clause casts doubt 
on presidential control of prosecutions. 
In a more general sense, constitutional structure also supports the chief 
prosecutor thesis.  Under the Constitution, Congress makes laws and the 
judiciary hears cases and controversies about the application of law to 
facts.  The executive is charged with executing judgments but it is also 
more broadly charged with executing the law—bringing cases or 
controversies before the courts in order to secure a definitive resolution of 
the dispute.  This is precisely the general system that underlay 
 
 106 See, e.g., Gwyn, supra note 18, at 476; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 15, 
n.56. 
 107 Caminker, supra note 22, at 355-56. 
 108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
 109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (the president “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment”). 
 110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress may make “all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” any power of the federal government). 
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Montesquieu’s famous separation of powers maxim, in which no two 
powers of government ought to be vested in one entity’s hands.  
Montesquieu’s maxim presupposed that the executive was in charge of law 
execution and, more particularly, prosecution.  Keeping prosecution 
separate from legislating is necessary to avoid the specter of tyrannical 
prosecution of tyrannical laws.  Keeping the judicial power separate from 
the executive helps ensure the possibility of a judicial check on tyrannical 
executive prosecutions. 
As noted, those who deny the Chief Prosecutor theory generally have 
eschewed text and structure and have instead relied upon history to make 
their case.  Ironically, constitutional history actually refutes their argument.  
History reveals that the wielder of the executive power could control 
official prosecutors.  Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson—
following a long line of chief executives in England, in the colonies, and in 
the states—directed official prosecutors to start and stop prosecutions.111  
Contrary to the claims of many revisionist scholars, there appears to have 
been a bipartisan, tri-branch consensus that the Constitution empowered the 
president to direct official prosecutors. 
A. Text 
The traditional view that prosecution is an executive function has solid 
textual support.  As discussed below, the executive power establishes 
presidential control of law execution.  Because prosecution is an important 
subset of the broader category of law execution, the grant of the executive 
power authorizes presidential control of prosecution.  Moreover, the 
Faithful Execution Clause, by requiring faithful presidential law execution, 
confirms that the president’s executive power includes law execution 
authority, including the right to control prosecutions. 
Although some have argued that the “executive power” granted by the 
Article II Vesting Clause merely refers to the list of specific powers vested 
with the president elsewhere in Article II,112 the better view is that the 
clause grants those powers traditionally understood to be vested with an 
executive, subject to the exceptions and limitations laid out in the 
Constitution.  Michael Ramsey and I have posited that one such traditional 
executive power is the power over foreign affairs.113  Subject to the 
Constitution’s numerous carve outs (such as Congress’s power to declare 
war and regulate commerce) and to the Constitution’s various checks on 
executive power (such as the requirement of a super-majority approval of 
 
 111 See infra Part II.C.4. 
 112 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 47-50. 
 113 See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
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treaties by the Senate), the president may direct foreign affairs.114 
Though the president’s executive power encompasses a residual 
control of foreign affairs,115 the principle meaning of executive power is the 
authority to execute the laws.  When one examines the dictionary meaning 
of executive, its meaning comes into sharper focus.  “Executive” comes 
from the verb “to execute,” which means to perform, or to carry into 
effect.116  Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, a dictionary from the founding era, 
defined “executive” as “[a]ctive; not deliberative; not legislative; having 
the power to put in act the laws.”117  Writing of that era, M.J.C. Vile notes 
that the executive branch got its name from its fundamental function, law 
execution.118  The Oxford English Dictionary confirms that this definition 
remains a standard one; it defines “executive” as a “distinctive epithet of 
that branch of the government which is concerned or charged with carrying 
out the laws, decrees, and judicial sentences.”119 
The Founders had the exact same understanding of the executive 
power.  Before, during, and after the Constitution’s ratification, the 
Founders most often used “executive power” as a synonym for the power 
to execute the laws.120  Not surprisingly, numerous statements from the 
founding era observe that the executive power was the power to execute the 
law and that the Constitution authorized the president to superintend those 
who execute the law.121  A unitary executive was seen as critical to 
ensuring prompt, uniform, energetic, and responsible law execution.122 
 
 114 Id. at 234-35. 
 115 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that “the 
Constitution envisioned two domains of presidential responsibility—foreign affairs and law 
enforcement”); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 113, at 234. 
 116 See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996) (Anne McDermott ed. 4th ed. 1773); see also 5 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 520 (2d ed. 1989) (denoting that “execute” comes from Latin “ex(s)ecut,” past 
participle stem of “ex(s)equi,” meaning “to follow out”). 
 117 JOHNSON, supra note 116. 
 118 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 67 (2d ed., 
Liberty Fund, Inc. 1998) (1967). 
 119 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 522. 
 120 See generally Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 18. 
 121 See generally id. 
 122 See, e.g., 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 42 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981) (“A 
Farmer” suggesting that when “the executive is changeable, he can never oppose large 
decided majorities of influential individuals—or enforce on those powerful men . . . the 
rigor of equal law, which is the grand and only object of human society”) (emphasis 
omitted); 2 id. at 310 (“The Federal Farmer” claiming that the president was “well 
circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws with discernment and decision, with 
promptitude and uniformity”); 3 The DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 201 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer Co. Publishers, Inc. 1987) (1888) (Edmund 
Randolph asserting that “[a]ll the enlightened part of mankind agree that the superior 
despatch, secrecy, and energy, with which one man can act, render it more politic to vest the 
power of executing the laws in one man”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
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No doubt, preventing violations of the law forms an important part of 
the executive’s law execution function.  But since the chief executive and 
his subordinate executives cannot possibly avert every breach of the law, 
one of the principal means of executing the law consists of sanctioning 
those who have already violated the law.  When an officer prosecutes 
someone to determine if the alleged offender ought to be sanctioned, the 
officer performs the quintessential executive function of law 
enforcement.123  Indeed, prosecution is an absolutely necessary part of law 
execution.  Under our system of separated powers, the executive cannot 
unilaterally enforce the law’s penalties.  Instead it must first, through 
prosecution, seek the judiciary’s sanction for the imposition of penalties. 
Though Congress creates the prosecutorial offices employing the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, the prosecutors that fill those offices should 
be regarded as the president’s instruments of law enforcement.  After all, 
the Constitution grants the president (and not Congress or statutorily-
created prosecutors) the power to execute the laws.  If government 
prosecutors help carry into execution the president’s powers over law 
execution, those prosecutors must be subject to presidential control.  In 
extreme cases, the president must be able to remove a prosecutor who acts 
contrary to the president’s law execution agenda.124 
The Faithful Execution Clause confirms that the president is 
empowered to control law execution, including prosecution.  In imposing a 
duty of faithful law execution, the Clause presupposes a law execution 
power in the first instance, for it would be somewhat odd to oblige the 
president to faithfully execute the law when he has absolutely no 
constitutional authority to fulfill the duty. 
Taken together, the Executive Power and Faithful Execution Clauses 
suggest that the president may direct official prosecutors and, in some 
cases, has a duty to do so.  Because official prosecutors help exercise the 
president’s executive power over law execution, the president can order 
official prosecutors in all their prosecutorial actions.  He can order them to 
commence or cease a prosecution, and he can instruct them in their conduct 
of prosecutions.  The president’s faithful execution duty may require him to 
use his executive power to direct the official prosecutors.  For instance, if 
 
65-66 (Max Farrand ed. 1966) (James Wilson observing that a “single magistrate” would 
supply the “most energy dispatch and responsibility” to those “powers he conceived strictly 
Executive [such as] those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not [connected to 
and] appointed by the Legislature”). 
 123 Cf. Letter from David Howell to William Greene (July 30, 1782), in 18 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 681 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1976) (noting that it was not clear whether 
prosecutions would be used by Congress to “enforce” a proposed law). 
 124 Of course, the claim made here is generalizable: in granting the president the power 
to execute the law, the Constitution establishes that the president may control all those who 
execute the law, not just official prosecutors. 
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the president believes that a prosecuted party is innocent, the president 
ought to instruct the official prosecutor to cease the prosecution.  Likewise, 
if the president concludes that some prosecutor has bungled the initial 
stages of a prosecution, the president should put the prosecution on a 
proper legal train, perhaps by directing the prosecutor to adopt better tactics 
and techniques or by instructing him on the proper meaning of the law.125 
One sometimes hears the suggestion that prosecution of criminal 
offenses is more of an executive function than prosecution of civil offenses.  
Though there may be sound policy reasons for drawing this distinction (say 
the greater perceived need for responsible, uniform, and energetic 
execution of criminal laws), nothing in the Constitution supports the notion 
that the president has firmer constitutional control over criminal 
prosecutions than he does over civil prosecutions.  Neither the president’s 
executive power of law execution nor the Faithful Execution Clause 
distinguishes criminal from civil laws.  Hence, the case for presidential 
control is equally strong (or weak) as to both.  If criminal prosecution is at 
the core of executive power as one prominent federal judge has 
suggested,126 so is civil prosecution.  No matter how one divides the 
universe of prosecutions, the president has constitutional authority over all 
prosecutions because all prosecutions involve law enforcement. 
As noted, some scholars have cited various presidential duties and 
powers as reasons to doubt the chief prosecutor thesis.  For instance, some 
have claimed that the Faithful Execution Clause obliges the president to 
abide by whatever laws Congress enacts.127  Hence, the president must take 
care to adhere to whatever prosecutorial structure that Congress devises.  If 
Congress decrees that presidents should not influence official prosecutors, 
the president must faithfully accept Congress’s choice. 
This absolutist view of the Faithful Execution Clause is too extreme, 
for it contemplates that the president must engage in constitutional self-
abnegation when a law so provides.  For instance, if the absolutist view is 
 
 125 The Faithful Execution Clause, considered in isolation, probably does not require 
presidential control of official prosecutors.  The Clause imposes a duty and does not convey 
a power.  Instead, the Executive Power Clause actually grants the president control of law 
execution and the instruments of law execution such as prosecutors.  Nonetheless, the 
Faithful Execution Clause is relevant because it imposes a duty on how the president ought 
to wield his executive power.  It acts as a salutary constraint on a broad grant of law 
execution power.  Moreover, as discussed later, neither the Faithful Execution Clause nor 
anything else in the Constitution requires Congress to provide the president prosecutorial 
support.  Though the Constitution presupposes that Congress will give the president the 
means of fulfilling his faithful execution duties, Congress need not create any prosecutors.  
Nonetheless, once Congress creates official prosecutors, they are under the president’s 
direction because they help carry into execution the president’s powers. 
 126 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, J.). 
 127 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 69; Caminker, supra note 22, at 357; see also 
Krent, supra note 18, at 281-85. 
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correct, then if Congress enacted a statute prohibiting presidential vetos, 
the president would have to take care to respect Congress’s statute and 
refrain from vetoing any legislation.  Likewise, the president would have to 
be faithful to a statute that stripped him of his commander-in-chief 
authority.  There is no reason to suppose that the clause requires the 
president enforce unconstitutional laws that infringe upon his powers.  
Such a view would regard the Faithful Execution Clause as a means by 
which Congress could treat the Constitution’s grants of presidential power 
as mere default rules that Congress could alter by ordinary legislation.  The 
more sensible reading is that the Faithful Execution Clause constrains the 
president’s executive power by requiring faithful law execution (including 
faithful prosecution). 
The pardon power also confirms that the president lacks constitutional 
control of prosecutions, or so some revisionists claim.128  It would make 
little sense for the Constitution to grant the president the power to pardon 
offenders prosecuted under his direction.  Instead, the president has a 
pardon power precisely so he can undo the efforts of prosecutors who are 
independent of him.129  Just as the veto power nullifies the legislation of an 
independent Congress, the pardon power similarly voids the prosecutions 
of independent prosecutors. 
This inference is unpersuasive.  To begin with, there is nothing 
incoherent about a president revisiting his administration’s prosecutorial 
decisions.  In hindsight, a president might conclude that someone his 
administration helped convict was actually innocent—as is well 
established, presidents and their subordinates are fallible.  Alternatively, a 
convicted felon might belatedly turn “state’s evidence” in return for a 
pardon.  Finally, a forgiving president might conclude that, upon reflection, 
a particular sentence was too harsh either because Congress specified too 
high a minimum penalty or because the individual has repented and shown 
remorse.  Hence, even within the confines of the revisionist argument, the 
pardon power is not rendered redundant when vested with the person who 
also controls prosecution. 
Of course, a major difficulty with the revisionist argument is that it 
fails to recognize that a president may pardon offenders prosecuted by 
earlier administrations.  Consequently, the pardon power is not just about 
undoing the effects of one’s own prosecutions.  Instead, the pardon power 
also enables presidents to assume intertemporal control over prior 
successful prosecutions.  Perhaps the most famous early example of this 
was Thomas Jefferson’s pardon of those convicted of violating the Sedition 
 
 128 See Krent, supra note 18, at 282. 
 129 Id. at 282 n.32 (observing that concerns about presidential power to pardon 
treasonous associates suggest lack of presidential control of prosecution). 
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Act.130  Jefferson used his pardon power to control the continuing effects of 
prosecutions undertaken by John Adams and his administration.131 
Equally damaging to the revisionist claim is its failure to appreciate 
that pardons also enable presidents to bar future prosecutions.  By itself, a 
decision not to prosecute someone has no res judicata like effects.  
Provided that the applicable statutes of limitations have not run, future 
administrations are free to reverse this decision.  In contrast, when a 
president issues a full pardon, he bars all future prosecution of the pardoned 
offenses.  Hence, the pardon power enables the president to gain a measure 
of control over at least some future prosecutorial activities in a way he 
could not if he merely controlled prosecutions while he was in office.  
When George Washington pardoned the Whiskey Rebels, for example, he 
not only precluded his administration from revisiting his decision, he also 
precluded subsequent presidents from prosecuting.132 
In short, there are no sound reasons to believe that the Constitution’s 
grant of pardon power indicates that the president lacks control of 
prosecution.  In fact, as we shall see later, the pardon power was justified in 
the 18th century as a natural complement to the chief executive’s 
prosecutorial power.  Since the president was the one “harmed” by the 
violation of the law (he was constitutionally injured by the breach of laws 
that he was empowered to execute), the president ought to have the ability 
to forgive (“pardon”) the violation.133 
 
 130 See infra Part II.C.4.c. (discussing Jefferson’s pardoning of those convicted under 
the Sedition Act). 
 131 Id. 
 132 This feature of the pardon power—the ability to preclude future prosecutions—may 
explain why some members of the founding generation were concerned that a president 
might pardon his treasonous associates.  See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 122, at 639 (George Mason warning that a president might pardon his treasonous 
co-conspirators).  While the president’s administration probably could be counted on not to 
prosecute a president’s co-conspirators, these associates would have to fear that future 
administrations would prosecute hem.  A pardon would preclude that possibility.  Hence, a 
president who wanted to safeguard his associates would pardon them rather than merely 
instructing his official prosecutors not to prosecute them. 
 133 The pardon power assists the president in curbing faithless prosecutions because the 
pardon power enables the president to stop an unfaithful prosecution dead in its tracks.  But 
the pardon power is a relatively blunt instrument of prosecutorial control because a full 
pardon bars subsequent prosecution.  On the other hand, when a president discontinues a 
prosecution by directing a nolle prosequi, a new prosecution can be commenced should 
circumstances warrant.  If it becomes clear that someone was guilty after all, the nolle 
prosequi may not bar a subsequent prosecution.  Notwithstanding the Constitution’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the government may bring a new prosecution even after it has 
discontinued a previous one grounded on the same offense.  Until the jury is empanelled and 
sworn or, in a nonjury trial, until the court has begun hearing evidence, the government may 
discontinue the suit and subsequently reinstate it without violating the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 394 (1975).  Up until the end of the 
18th century, England had a much more pro-prosecution rule, where discontinuing a 
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The remaining power thought to be fatal to the Chief Prosecutor thesis 
is the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Some scholars claim that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to determine how to “carry 
into execution” Congress’ legislative powers over tax, commerce, 
copyright, etc.  Congress thus may determine by law who may prosecute 
violations of federal law, for in so doing, Congress carries into execution 
its legislative powers.134  The Necessary and Proper Clause, it is said, 
authorizes any prosecutorial structure that Congress might see fit to enact, 
including independent prosecutors.135 
This argument is infirm.  To begin with, the revisionist reading fails to 
pay sufficient attention to the actual language of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Under the Clause, Congress does not have power to pass whatever 
laws it deems relevant for carrying into execution the powers of the federal 
government.  To be justified under the Clause, Congress may only pass 
laws that are necessary and proper.  It hardly seems “necessary,” even 
under the least restrictive meaning of that word, for Congress to grant 
independent government prosecutors a measure of the executive power 
when the Constitution already grants the president the executive power in 
toto. 
Similarly, if the Constitution explicitly grants the president the power 
to execute the laws, it hardly seems “proper” for Congress to pass laws 
altering this allocation of power.  The only way such laws could be viewed 
as proper is if the president’s law execution power is a default rule.  Yet 
there is absolutely nothing in the Vesting Clause that suggests that the grant 
of executive power is qualified.  The Vesting Clause does not read like the 
Appointments Clause, which makes clear that presidential nomination of 
inferior officers is but a default rule that Congress may change by statute.136 
Nonetheless, if we chose to read the Executive Power Clause as a 
default grant of power subject to congressional modification, we should 
likewise read every other structural grant in the same way.  Nothing in the 
Constitution’s text suggests that powers like the veto power or the treaty 
power are any more absolute than the executive power.  If the latter power 
is subject to congressional modification, the same should be true of all 
 
prosecution never barred subsequent prosecutions.  See Nolle Prosequi, 1958 CRIM. L. REV. 
573, 574 (1958); Criminal Law—Nolle Prosequi—Trial Court Has Power to Dismiss for 
Want of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 996, 997 (1966). 
 134 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 68-70. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
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constitutional grants of power.  Needless to say, this seems rather unlikely.  
Few people regard the entire structural Constitution as merely creating 
default rules subject to congressional alteration. 
Revisionist scholars are right to believe that Congress has tremendous 
discretion under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  They are wrong to 
suppose that the Clause grants Congress carte blanche to rearrange or 
redistribute the Constitution’s grants of powers, including the president’s 
power over prosecution. 
B. Structure 
The Constitution vests each of the three branches of government with a 
different type of power.  The legislative powers vested in Congress—the 
powers to enact enumerated types of laws137—do not encompass the 
authority to prosecute.  Congress may lay out rules that form the bases of 
violations and subsequent prosecutions, but it may not prosecute on its 
own, for such actions would not be the making of laws but the execution of 
them.138  The only time Congress may prosecute is when the House sends 
agents to the Senate to help secure an impeachment conviction.  Though 
the House has broad jurisdiction—it can prosecute high crimes and 
misdemeanors139—its prosecutorial authority is severely limited because no 
real punishment results from a successful prosecution and because it may 
only prosecute officers of the United States.140  Impeachment convictions 
are not an aspect of law enforcement and merely serve as a means of 
regulating who can serve as an officer of the United States. 
Like their executive counterparts, judges execute the law as well.  Both 
prosecutors and courts must determine if someone has violated the law.  In 
deciding whether to prosecute, the prosecutor makes a determination about 
whether the evidence suggests that someone has violated the law.  Once the 
 
 137 For a defense of the proposition that the “legislative power” refers to the power to 
make rules for society, see Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1305, 
1310-13, 1316-17 (2003). 
 138 Dangel cites contempt prosecutions conducted by early chambers of Congress as 
evidence that prosecution is not an executive function.  Dangel, supra note 18, at 1086.  But 
this confuses the action with the actor.  Not everything that Congress does is legislative in 
nature.  For instance, Congress’s impeachment function is an exercise of judicial power, and 
the Senate’s role in appointments and treaties are exercises of executive power.  If Congress 
may prosecute people for contempt of Congress, Congress has a portion of the executive 
power. 
 139 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 
(“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”). 
 140 See supra note 139; U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”). 
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prosecution commences, the judiciary (judge or jury) must make an 
independent determination of guilt or innocence.  This superficial similarity 
in decision making has led some to regard prosecutors as making quasi-
judicial decisions.141  For perhaps the same reasons, others have asserted 
that prosecution is as much a judicial task as it is an executive one.142 
We ought not conflate two related, but distinct, activities.  The 
prosecutorial function consists of the exercise of tremendous discretion in 
deciding when and how to bring prosecutions.  Courts lack such discretion.  
For good structural reasons, federal courts do not possess a roving 
commission to execute the law.  Though judges decide cases and 
controversies brought to them, they cannot generate the cases and 
controversies themselves.  That is to say, their judicial power does not 
empower them to decide which questions ought to be brought before 
them.143  Indeed, once a case is properly brought before them, they 
typically must decide the case.  Since judges cannot decide which cases 
will be brought before them and typically cannot decline to decide cases 
brought before them, judicial officers lack the discretion inherent in the 
prosecutorial function.  In short, the judiciary’s narrow yet crucial type of 
law execution—typically called judging—cannot encompass prosecution. 
Likewise, grand juries cannot prosecute or compel others to prosecute.  
Under the Fifth Amendment, grand jury presentments or indictments are 
necessary for the prosecutions of infamous crimes.144  Nonetheless, while 
grand juries can indict individuals even against the wishes of the district 
 
 141 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1312 n.9 (2002) (citing scholars who 
claim prosecution is quasi-judicial). 
 142 See, e.g., Gwyn, supra note 18, at 502. 
 143 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801-02 (1987), 
contends that courts may initiate prosecutions for contempts of court when the ordinary 
prosecutor refuses the courts request to begin a contempt prosecution.  The Court reached 
this conclusion by asserting that if the judiciary lacked the power to bring contempt 
prosecutions, it would be completely dependent upon the executive to vindicate the 
judiciary’s rights.  Id.  The Court’s decision is wrong—courts do not have the authority to 
initiate prosecutions merely to avoid dependence on the executive.  See Young, 481 U.S. at 
817-18 (Scalia J., concurring) (noting that courts decide cases and cannot seek out violators 
in order to punish them).  There is absolutely nothing unusual about one branch being 
dependent upon another.  The executive and the judiciary must rely on Congress for funds 
and officers.  If Congress does not adequately fund the executive or the judicial branch, 
neither has the right to raid the Treasury themselves.  Likewise, should the executive decline 
to enforce the judiciary’s judgments, the judiciary cannot create its own enforcement 
mechanism.  Even if one thought Young correct, however, it would be the exception that 
proved the general rule.  The case implicitly acknowledges that the executive branch 
controls prosecutions, save for the unique situation where judicial initiation of prosecutions 
is necessary to prosecute contempts of court.  See id. at 818 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(declaring that general principle that judiciary cannot initiate prosecutions is “uncontested”). 
 144 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”). 
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attorneys, grand juries cannot force prosecutors to act on their indictments.  
Grand juries are limited to a checking role. 
If we regard prosecution as a critical governmental function—an 
indispensable means of ensuring that the laws are not but a dead 
corpse145—the only constitutional entity left, after we eliminate the 
Congress and the judiciary as possibilities, is the executive.  In other words 
our knowledge of the principal functions of the legislature and judiciary 
suggests that the president may control law execution, and prosecutions in 
particular, for no other branch has the generic power to execute the laws. 
Consistent with this deduction, Montesquieu’s famous separation 
maxim presupposed that the executive was in charge of prosecutions.  
Montesquieu warned that tyranny would result should any one entity 
exercise two or more of the three fundamental powers of government.  
“Were [the judicial power] joined to the executive power, the judge might 
behave with violence and oppression,” Montesquieu famously claimed.146  
Why could the judge behave in this way?  Because if the same person both 
executed and judged, there could be no check on this executive/judge.  A 
person possessed of both prosecutorial and judicial functions is unlikely to 
engage in an odd self-checking exercise.147  As an example of this problem 
of combined executive and judicial functions, Montesquieu cited the Italian 
republics, where informers could make wild accusations before state 
inquisitors who would then execute the law without the benefit of a judicial 
check.148 
Montesquieu likewise advised that, should the legislative and the 
executive powers be united, the executive could not mitigate the effects of 
tyrannical laws.  Instead, tyrannical laws would be tyrannically executed.149  
Once again, the only grounds for dreading the combination of executive 
and legislative powers is that, when those powers are combined, the 
 
 145 CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789 48 (Da 
Capo Press ed. 1969) (1923) (comments accompanying revised New Hampshire 
Constitution of 1784) (“This [executive] power is the active principle of all governments: it 
is the soul, and without it the body politic is but a dead corpse.”); see also 1 JOHN ADAMS, A 
DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 372 
(Da Capo Press ed. 1971) (1787) (comments of John Adams) (“The executive power is 
properly the government; the laws are a dead letter until an administration begins to carry 
them into execution.”). 
 146 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 70 (Frank Neuman ed., 
Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (1748). 
 147 Someone vested with both executive and judicial powers will undoubtedly decide 
whether someone has violated the laws.  But she will make this decision only once and not 
twice.  When it comes to law execution, the genius of the separation of powers is that, 
typically, two branches must independently conclude that some party has violated the law 
before anyone is punished.  That benefit is clearly absent when the executive and judiciary 
are one and the same. 
 148 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 146, at 70. 
 149 Id. 
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executive/legislative entity will compound tyrannical laws with tyrannical 
prosecutions.150 
Constitutional text and structure can tell us quite a bit about control of 
prosecution if we know what to make of the executive power, the Faithful 
Execution Clause, and the juxtaposition of the three powers of government.  
Because the executive power is the power to execute the law and because 
prosecution is a vital means of executing the law, the executive power 
encompasses the right to control prosecutions.  Likewise, the Faithful 
Execution Clause requires that the president exercise his executive power 
to ensure faithful law execution.  Sometimes the president’s faithful 
execution duty requires him to use his executive power to order 
prosecutions to ensure faithful execution of penal statutes.  Other times that 
duty will require him to use his executive power to stop, restrain, or 
redirect prosecutions in order to preclude or avoid an unfaithful execution.  
Finally, the Constitution’s structure suggests that the Constitution vests 
power over law execution, including prosecution, with the president. 
Of course, there are many who do not find arguments from text and 
structure all that persuasive.  For many, something more will be 
necessary—historical support for presidential control of official 
prosecutions.  Consistent with the textual and structural arguments, the next 
subpart confirms that in the eighteenth century, chief executives could 
control official prosecutors. 
C. The Historical Relationship Between Chief Executives and Official 
Prosecutors 
History supplies the best evidence for the proposition that the 
Constitution authorizes the president to control official prosecutors.  Due to 
its executive power, the English crown was deemed the prosecutor of all 
offenses against the laws and oversaw the prosecutions of the attorney 
general and other official attorneys.  In the colonies and the states, state 
governors directed official prosecutors.  Continuing the trend, Presidents 
Washington, Adams, and Jefferson repeatedly directed official prosecutors, 
instructing them to prosecute some individuals and to cease prosecuting 
others. 
Early presidential direction of prosecutors was based on an 
understanding of the executive’s constitutional authority, for no statute ever 
authorized presidential control.  In presidential proclamations, in addresses 
to Congress, and in correspondence, presidents often noted that they had 
given instructions to official prosecutors, sometimes articulating the 
 
 150 Because the Founders clearly embraced Montesquieu’s separation maxim, it does 
not matter whether Montesquieu’s maxim is objectively true.  Having enshrined it in the 
Constitution, the Founders ensured that neither the legislature nor the judiciary has a 
constitutional ability to exercise the executive power to execute the laws. 
29
Prakash:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
PRAKASH_ME 2/22/2005  5:05 PM 
1730 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 73:1701 
constitutional bases of their actions.  Attorneys general likewise 
acknowledged that they were executive officers under presidential control 
and regularly conveyed presidential instructions to the district attorneys.  
Finally, the district attorneys never complained that, by directing them, the 
president had improperly usurped discretion granted to them by statute.  
Indeed, recognizing that they were not free agents, they sometimes sought 
direction from the president and his immediate subordinates. 
The other branches apparently never protested against presidential 
control of the district attorneys.  To the contrary, there appears to have been 
a bipartisan, tri-branch consensus that the president could control official 
prosecutors.  Many members of Congress agreed that the president could 
direct prosecutors in the execution of the law.  For instance, the Senate 
requested President John Adams to direct a district attorney to commence a 
prosecution.  Likewise, members of the judiciary occasionally mentioned 
the president’s role in bringing cases before them, even holding the 
executive accountable for some perceived flaw in the prosecution.  Since 
the president was empowered to execute the laws and charged with faithful 
execution, it was natural for the president to bear responsibility for any 
prosecutions commenced by his officers. 
1. The Crown’s Official Prosecutors 
In England, the king was regarded as the constitutional prosecutor of 
all offenses.  Following the Lockean tradition, William Blackstone claimed 
that, in the state of nature, everyone enjoyed the executive power to punish 
those who transgressed the laws of nature.151  Blackstone argued that when 
individuals formed a civil society, they transferred the power of execution 
or punishment to the chief magistrate.152  As part of that transfer, 
individuals agreed that the chief magistrate would bring prosecutions of 
those who violated the law.153  Though violations of the law “seem . . . to 
be rather offences against the kingdom than the king; yet as the public . . . 
has delegated all it’s [sic] power and rights, with regard to the execution of 
the laws, to one visible magistrate,” such infractions should be considered 
affronts to the chief magistrate to whom the public has delegated its right to 
execute.154  In other words, given the Crown’s control of the executive 
power, the chief magistrate is “the proper person to prosecute for all public 
offences and breaches of the peace, being the person injured in the eye of 
 
 151 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *7-8. 
 152 See 4 id. 
 153 4 id. at *8 (“Whatever power therefore individuals had of punishing offences 
against the law of nature, that is now vested in the magistrate alone; who bears the sword of 
justice by the consent of the whole community.”). 
 154 4 id. at *268. 
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the law.”155  Moreover, because a violation of the laws injures the chief 
executive, he is a fitting receptacle of society’s willingness to show mercy 
on those who have violated the law.156  As Blackstone remarked, “it is 
reasonable that he only who is injured should have the power of 
forgiving.”157  Thus, the English thought it quite sensible to vest the pardon 
power with the chief prosecutor. 
The English monarch did not actually go to court and argue cases; 
rather, the crown prosecuted offenses in one of two ways.  Most offenses 
were prosecuted by the public on behalf of the crown.158  Typically, the 
popular prosecutor kept a portion of any fine or forfeiture recovered and 
the rest went to the crown.159  Part III discusses this category of 
prosecutions.  The second method of prosecution involved prosecutions 
brought by the crown’s attorneys.  His two principal attorneys were the 
attorney general and the solicitor general.  The attorney general prosecuted 
serious offenses where the crown had a particular interest and did so by 
simple information in the case of misdemeanors and by indictment in 
capital offenses.160  The attorney general could also sue for debts owed the 
crown.161  The solicitor general was deemed the attorney general’s deputy 
and had the same powers as the attorney general.162  The crown had other 
attorneys but could also hire special attorneys if it saw fit.163  In this 
system, these attorneys worked under the direction of the crown.164 
In the celebrated case of Wilkes v. The King,165 decided in 1768, Chief 
Justice Wilmot discussed the king’s role in prosecution: 
By our constitution, the King is entrusted with the prosecution of 
all crimes which disturb the peace and order of society . . . .  [F]or 
 
 155 1 id. at *269; see also 4 id. at *2 (noting that the king “is supposed by the law to be 
the person injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to that community, and 
is therefore in all cases the proper prosecutor for every public offence”); 4 id at *176-77 
(asserting that by virtue of his “executory power of the law” the king may prosecute those 
public wrongs that violate the laws of nature, that result in a breach of peace, and that 
threaten to subvert civil society). 
 156 As might be expected, there are all sorts of limitations on the English king’s power 
of pardon.  See 4 id. at *398 (nothing the king cannot pardon private appeals or pardon an 
impeachment).  Some of these limitations clearly extend to the United States Constitution.  
See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1 (barring pardons in cases of impeachment). 
 157 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *269. 
 158 See infra Part III (discussing popular prosecutions). 
 159 See infra Part III. 
 160 Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney 
General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 309 (1958). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 305. 
 163 Id. at 308. 
 164 For a general history of the attorneys of the crown, see J.L.J. EDWARDS, THE LAW 
OFFICERS OF THE CROWN (1964). 
 165 Wilkes v. The King, 97 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B. 1768). 
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that reason, all proceedings, “ad vindictam et poenam” are called 
in the law, the pleas or suits of the Crown . . . .  All indictments 
and informations, granted by the King’s Bench, are the King’s 
suits, and under his controul; informations filed by his Attorney 
General, are most emphatically his suits, because they are the 
immediate emanations of his will and pleasure.166 
Wilmot’s explanation echoed Blackstone’s conclusions.  In England, 
the crown was charged with executing the law and prosecuted offenses 
with the help of its attorneys. 
2. Official Prosecution in the Colonies and States 
Prior to the creation of the state constitutions, most of the American 
colonies had established systems of official prosecution that were more 
comprehensive and advanced than the then existing English system.  Rather 
than having a handful of official prosecutors concerned only with great 
matters of state, official prosecutors were typically scattered across the 
colonies and were charged with prosecuting all manner of offenses.  As 
part of their general law enforcement powers, colonial governors could 
direct these official prosecutors.167  Evarts Boutell Greene, a noted 
authority on the colonial and Revolutionary periods of American history, 
claimed that, because it was the colonial governor’s duty to execute the 
laws, “with him also rested in part the duty of prosecution.”168  To this end, 
the colonial governor could direct the attorney general, whether or not the 
governor actually had appointed him.169  Discussing specific colonies, 
Oliver Hammonds confirmed that chief executives (or executive councils) 
could direct and end official prosecutions.170  Finally, Julius Goebel and 
Raymond Naughton, in their exhaustive study of law enforcement in 
colonial New York, likewise noted that the colonial governor could order 
prosecutions commenced and could require the official prosecutors to enter 
a nolle prosequi.171 
The early state constitutions favored legislatures at the expense of the 
 
 166 Id. at 125. 
 167 EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 
OF NORTH AMERICA 139 (1898). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Oliver W. Hammonds, The Attorney General in the American Colonies, in 2 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY SERIES, SERIES 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 20 (1939) (describing 
how prosecutors were directed by governors and executive councils in various colonies). 
 171 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. &  T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 154, 200, 367, 369, 374, 378 
(1944).  Goebel and Naughton also noted that judges occasionally ordered prosecutions and 
nolle prosequi’s, as well.  See id. at 367. 
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executives.172  This bias reflected a lingering ill will toward the king and 
his executive agents in the colonies.173  Since the state executives were in 
many respects the successors to the English crown, the architects of the 
state constitutions apparently felt that the executives ought to be under the 
legislature’s thumb.174  Accordingly, executives faced numerous structural 
disabilities: short terms, term limits, legislative selection, and limited 
appointment powers.175  In the extreme, some constitutions granted 
executive powers to a council, thereby ensuring that the exercise of such 
powers would not be efficient or vigorous.176 
Despite all these structural handicaps, the chief executives of the 
states—like their colonial predecessors—retained the power to control 
official prosecutions.  The nation’s first Congress repeatedly requested that 
the state executive powers direct the initiation of prosecutions for the 
benefit of the nation.177  Sometimes Congress passed general resolutions 
beseeching all states executives to commence prosecutions when 
appropriate.178  Other times, Congress made specific requests, such as those 
addressed to the Delaware president, the Rhode Island and Virginia 
governors, and the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts supreme executive 
councils.179  These requests were variously phrased: sometimes the requests 
specifically mentioned that the executive power ought to direct the state 
attorney general to begin the prosecution,180 and other times the chief 
executives were merely beseeched to order the prosecution.181  One can 
 
 172 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 18, at 757-58. 
 173 Id. at 759. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 760-61. 
 176 Id. at 757-58. 
 177 See, e.g., infra notes 231-231 and accompanying text. 
 178 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 812 (1779) (Congress requesting that 
governors prosecute individuals in the quartermasters department whenever they believed 
such individuals had misbehaved). 
 179 6 id. at 950 (including resolution directing “Secret Committee” to write letter to 
Rhode Island Governor to prosecute a captain if necessary); 14 id. at 754 (including 
resolution requesting the Delaware president to prosecute Henry O’Hara, a deputy 
quartermaster general); 14 id. at 857 (including resolution requesting the governor of 
Virginia, the president of Pennsylvania, and the Massachusetts executive council to punish 
certain individuals); Samuel Holten’s Diary, in 13 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 
supra note 123, at 276 (Holten confirming that Congress had requested these governors to 
prosecute). 
 180 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 178, at 40 (including 
resolution requesting Pennsylvania executive council to “direct” the Pennsylvania attorney 
general to prosecute in the name of the United States). 
 181 3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 273 
(1889) (including resolution requesting Pennsylvania executive to “direct” a prosecution) 
(“[T]he president and executive council of Pennsylvania be informed that any prosecution 
which it may be expedient to direct for such matters . . . shall be carried on at the expense of 
the United States.”). 
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fairly infer that these requests were predicated on the general understanding 
that each of the state chief executives could direct prosecutions.  Otherwise, 
Congress directed its appeals to the wrong state institutions and ought to 
have directly sought the assistance of the attorneys general or individual 
state prosecutors.  Congress apparently recognized that prosecutorial 
control was a feature of the executive power granted to state chief 
executives by the state constitutions and hence acted on the belief that 
governors and executive councils could direct prosecutions.182 
State chief executives understood that they could direct prosecutions 
and the actions of the official prosecutors.  On a number of occasions, the 
Pennsylvania supreme executive council directed its attorney general.183  
Likewise, George Clinton, governor of New York, directed his Attorney 
General, Egbert Benson.184  And presumably, the governors from other 
states, when requested by Congress to prosecute certain offenders, directed 
the commencement of prosecutions.  Nothing suggests that congressional 
appeals for the commencement of prosecutions went unheeded on the 
grounds that the other chief executives could not order prosecutions.185 
 
 182 Congress never declared why it addressed its requests to the chief executives of the 
states.  It is possible that each state had a statute in place that granted the chief executive the 
power to control official prosecutions and that Congress made its request with this 
information in mind.  If that were the case, the chief executives’ authority would arise from 
statutes rather than the state constitution.  All this seems unlikely, however.  To begin with, 
English practice suggested that the chief executive controlled official prosecutors.  See 
supra Part II.C.1.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that every state had in place statutes 
authorizing chief executive control of official prosecutors.  The most likely reason why 
Congress believed that state chief executives could direct official prosecutions was that 
Congress regarded prosecutorial control as an authority granted to the wielder of the 
executive power. 
 183 See Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. 233, 233 (1788) (stating that defendant applied to 
state executive to direct the attorney general to bring his matter before the court, and the 
executive complied); Letter from John Dickinson to Attorney General Longchamps (May 
25, 1784), in 11 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 467 (1855) (Pennsylvania president directing 
attorney general to prosecute); Letter from John Dickinson to the Minister of France (June 
4, 1784), in 11 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, supra, at 482 (notifying French minister that the 
council would give instructions to prosecute to the attorney general); Letter from William 
Bradford, Attorney General, to  President Franklin (Feb. 27, 1788), in 11 PENNSYLVANIA 
ARCHIVES, supra, at 250 (attorney general asking for direction from council regarding 
executing judgments). 
 184 See Letter from New York Delegates to George Clinton (Apr. 23, 1783), in 20 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 123, at 210, 211 n.3 (New York delegates 
noting that New York attorney general had briefed New York congressional delegates per 
the governor’s instructions); Letter from Nathan Dane to Caleb Davis (June 12, 1787), in 24 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra, at 325-26 (noting that governor had directed 
attorney general to bring prosecution). (New York delegates noting that New York attorney 
general had briefed New York congressional delegates per the governor’s instructions). 
 185 Given the long tradition of chief executive control of official prosecutors, that the 
state chief executives’ were empowered to superintend law execution, and that Congress 
clearly assumed that state chief executives could control prosecutions, it seems likely that all 
the state chief executives could control official prosecutors. 
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Some lessons emerge from these practices.  Colonial chief executives 
were thought to enjoy the power to direct official prosecutors.  Though no 
state constitution vested the state executive(s) with the “prosecution 
power,” the state chief executives likewise enjoyed the power to direct 
prosecutions.  Consistent with that conclusion, chief executive control of 
prosecution spanned different types of states—some with constitutions 
passed in the wake of independence, e.g., Pennsylvania, New York, 
Massachusetts, and others that were still governed by royal charters, e.g., 
Rhode Island. 
Of perhaps greater relevance, we have direct evidence that both New 
York’s and Pennsylvania’s chief executives could direct official 
prosecutions.186  Because both state constitutions granted executive power 
and contained a precursor of the Faithful Execution Clause, the power 
exercised by these state chief executives provides a glimpse of the original 
understanding of the federal Constitution.  Given the federal Constitution’s 
parallel provisions, the practices in New York and Pennsylvania offer a 
good reason to read the federal Constitution as likewise authorizing the 
federal chief executive to control official prosecutions. 
3. Official Prosecution and the Founding 
While there was a great deal of disagreement about the structure and 
the peripheral powers of the proposed federal executive, there was 
unanimity on one point: the chief executive would be empowered to 
execute federal law.187  As James Wilson put it at the Philadelphia 
Convention, this power was “strictly executive.”188  Indeed, the ability to 
execute the law and to control the law execution of officers was regarded as 
the defining trait of a chief executive.  Hence it is hardly surprising that 
both Federalists and Anti-federalists understood that a president granted the 
executive power would be empowered to superintend law execution.189 
Was prosecution intended to be encompassed in the president’s law 
execution function?  It is difficult to conclude otherwise.  As a matter of 
context, we have seen that prosecution was regarded as an executive 
function by the Continental Congress, by the state governors, and by 
Blackstone and Montesquieu.  This historical practice underlay founding 
era discussions of the president’s fundamental role in law enforcement.  
Participants in the great debate regarded a unitary executive as necessary 
for egalitarian execution of the laws, where even the privileged would be 
subject to the law.190  Likewise, as James Wilson observed, a unitary 
 
 186 See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text. 
 187 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 18, at 777. 
 188 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 122, at 66. 
 189 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 18, at 788. 
 190 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 122, at 21-22 (comments of a 
35
Prakash:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
PRAKASH_ME 2/22/2005  5:05 PM 
1736 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 73:1701 
executive was regarded as vital to ensure vigorous, prompt, and responsible 
execution of the laws.191  Finally, a unitary executive was regarded as 
essential to achieving uniformity in law execution.192  While there certainly 
are aspects of law execution that do not involve prosecution, such as the 
expenditure of appropriated funds, it is hard to believe that participants in 
these debates were referring to these secondary aspects of law execution.  
The better reading is that when participants in the framing and ratifying 
debates referred to the law execution powers of the president, they were 
referring principally to the power to investigate and prosecute alleged 
offenders. As an Anti-federalist put it, the president was to be “a vindex 
injuriarum–an avenger of public wrongs” and was “to enforce the rigor of 
equal law.”193  The president would avenge public wrongs and ensure the 
rigor of equal law by prosecuting those who violated federal law.194 
4. Prosecutions in the New Republic 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created an attorney general and numerous 
district attorneys.195  The attorney general was more of a general attorney 
rather than an officer statutorily empowered to command other 
governmental attorneys.196  The attorney general was to advise the 
president and represent the United States before the Supreme Court.197  His 
duties were thought to be so light that he was expected to carry on a private 
practice on the side to supplement his government pay.  Seeking to make 
the office of the attorney general more like its state counterparts (where the 
state attorneys general could direct local state attorneys), Edmund 
Randolph, the first attorney general, sought statutory authority to direct the 
 
“Farmer”). 
 191 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 122, at 65. 
 192 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 122, at 310; 2 DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 122, at 128. 
 193 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 122, at 21 (comments of a 
“Farmer”). 
 194 5 id. at 21-22.  One might question why there were not more specific discussions of 
prosecution.  As suggested in the text, the most likely answer is that prosecution was 
addressed as part of the broader category of law execution.  To make a claim about the 
Constitution’s original meaning, there need not be plentiful discussions of the particular 
power in the drafting and ratifying debates.  For instance, one could claim that as a matter of 
original understanding, Congress may impose tariffs as part of its foreign commerce power, 
even if there were no discussions about tariff imposition.  Given the history of foreign 
commerce, it was clear that the foreign commerce power included the power to set unilateral 
tariffs.  Likewise, given that prosecution was understood to be an executive power and part 
of the law execution function in particular, when the Constitution granted the executive 
power, it granted the president control of prosecutions. 
 195 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789). 
 196 Id. at 93. 
 197 Id. 
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federal district attorneys.198  Congress acquiesced only long after 
Randolph’s demise.199 
In fact, neither the Judiciary Act nor any other federal act granted 
anyone authority to superintend the district attorneys.  Given that no 
official had statutory authority to direct these district attorneys, many 
scholars have supposed that the Constitution, as originally understood, 
never authorized centralized presidential control over federal prosecutors.  
According to these scholars, where official prosecutions were concerned, 
there was nothing remotely resembling a unitary executive. 
On many levels, this revisionist account is mistaken.  Presidents 
Washington, Adams, and Jefferson believed that they had constitutional 
authority to direct federal district attorneys.  In fact, each directed district 
attorneys to begin and cease prosecutions in a number of contexts: cases 
suffused with foreign affairs implications; cases involving the domestic 
political opposition; and even cases concerning the nation’s territorial 
integrity. 
Significantly, presidential control of official prosecutions was not 
something controversial (or worse yet, contrary to law), such that the 
presidents felt the need to keep their involvement under wraps.  Rather, 
presidents were quite open about their direction, discussing their control in 
published speeches and proclamations.  The presidents understood that they 
were constitutionally empowered to direct official prosecutions. 
The other branches agreed that the Constitution empowered the 
president to represent the United States in the courts.  For instance, the 
Senate requested President Adams to instruct a district attorney to bring a 
prosecution.  Likewise, the Supreme Court refused to hear a case when it 
was unsure whether the president had authorized the attorney general to 
appear before the Supreme Court.  Once again, because no statute 
authorized presidential control, both episodes reflect the understanding that 
the president was constitutionally empowered to control the representation 
of the United States. 
a. George Washington 
On numerous occasions, President Washington directed his district 
attorneys.  Typically, he relayed his directions through his subordinates: the 
secretaries of state and treasury and the attorney general.  Occasionally, he 
would instruct a district attorney directly.  Washington would sometimes 
accompany his instructions (or his public explanation of them) with a 
citation to the Faithful Execution Clause or his general power to execute 
the laws, indicating that Washington regarded his prosecutorial authority as 
 
 198 Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 26, 1791), in 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 46 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds. 1833). 
 199 See Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. 
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arising out of the Constitution itself. 
In response to the Whiskey Rebellion brewing in western 
Pennsylvania, Washington directed prosecutions over the course of two 
years.  Continuing an American tradition of tax rebellion, western 
Pennsylvanians violently opposed a federal tax on spirits.  In September of 
1792, Washington issued a proclamation in which he maintained that his 
faithful execution duty required “that every legal and necessary step should 
be pursued . . . to bring to justice the infractors of the laws.”200  To that end, 
he charged all officers (both judicial and executive) to enforce the laws and 
warned that “all lawful ways and means will be strictly put in execution for 
bringing to justice the infractors.”201  The next month, Washington set the 
wheels of justice in motion by “direct[ing]” Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph to attend the circuit court in York Town, Pennsylvania in order to 
supervise the indictment of those who had opposed the execution of the 
excise law.202  In a November 1792 speech to Congress, Washington noted 
that his administration had begun prosecuting offenders.  He also assured 
Congress “that nothing within Constitutional and legal limits, which may 
depend on me, shall be wanting to assert and maintain the just authority of 
the laws.”203 
In 1793, Washington concluded that two “respectable persons” had not 
rioted and “instruct[ed]” William Rawle, the Pennsylvania district attorney, 
to enter a nolle prosequi on their indictments204—apparently the very 
 
 200 Proclamation of Sept. 15, 1792, in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 150-
51 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., United States Government Printing Press 1931). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of the Treasury (Oct. 1, 1792), in 
32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 173-74; see also Letter from 
George Washington to the Attorney General (Oct. 1, 1792), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra, at 171-72 (expressing his “desire” that Randolph attend the 
proceedings at York Town to ensure that the prosecutions proceeded “properly” and “in a 
manner to which no exception can be taken with propriety”).  Earlier, Washington had noted 
that he would lend all his “sanction and authority” to commence the prosecutions at York 
Town if Attorney General Randolph thought that there were indictable offenses.  Letter 
from George Washington to the Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 7, 1792), in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 143-45. 
 203 President George Washington, Fourth Annual Address to Congress (Nov. 6, 1792), 
in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 205. 
 204 Letter from George Washington to William Rawle (March 13, 1793), in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 386.  This was not the only occasion 
that Washington ended a prosecution.  After giving instructions to Christopher Gore, the 
Massachusetts district attorney, to prosecute the French consul for obstructing law 
enforcement officers, see Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Christopher Gore (Sept. 2, 1793), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(tj080013)), 
Washington decided not to prosecute the consul and revoked his exequatur instead, see 
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Christopher Gore (Nov. 22, 1793), 
http://memory.loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj1/019/0900/0978.jpg (Jefferson describing how 
French had protested revocation of exequatur). 
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indictments that had been secured in conformance with Washington’s 
earlier instructions to Attorney General Randolph.205  Later, when it 
became apparent that ordinary law enforcement measures would be 
insufficient to suppress the tax rebellion, Washington called out the state 
militias to restore law and order.  He ordered Rawle to accompany the 
marching militia in order to prosecute offenders the militia apprehended. 
Knowing that Washington was particularly interested in the prosecutions, 
Rawle apprised Washington of his progress.206  Despite his earlier orders, 
Washington eventually decided that very few of the rebels deserved 
punishment. 
In mid 1793, while the European powers were waging war, the 
American president determined that the United States ought to remain 
strictly neutral.  Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality warned that his 
administration would punish Americans who committed, aided, or abetted 
hostilities against any of the warring powers.207  He also announced that he 
had “given instructions to those officers to whom it belongs, to cause 
prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall . . . violate the 
law of nations.”208  Both the English and the French sought the prosecution 
of those who violated Washington’s proclamation.209 To mollify the 
English, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson told the English 
representative, George Hammond, that individuals assisting France were 
being prosecuted at the direction of the president.210  Likewise, when the 
French representative, Edmond Genet, complained that French consuls 
were being harassed, Jefferson instructed the district attorneys to “take any 
 
 205 See supra note 202. 
 206 See Letter of William Rawle to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 25, 1795), 
http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/108/0300/0397.jpg (describing progress of 
prosecutions). 
 207 Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 430. 
 208 32 id. at 430-31; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15, 
1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40-41 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950) (expressing 
the “desire” of the government to have Rawle prosecute citizens of the United States who 
have committed “depredations on the property and commerce” of other nations); Opinion on 
the Restoration of Prizes (May 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra at 
50-51 (opining, at the request of the president, that Britain should be satisfied by the 
executive’s promise to prosecute Americans who had joined a French privateer); Letter from 
George Washington to The Secretary of the Treasury (May 7, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 430 (Washington wondering whether someone 
ought to write to the district attorneys “requiring their attention to the observance of the 
Injunctions of the Proclamation”). 
 209 See Opinion on the Restoration of Prizes (May 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208; infra note 210. 
 210 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 270-71 (noting that the district attorney 
had been instructed to prosecute those who had captured an English vessel within the waters 
of the United States). 
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measures which [the laws] authorize to prevent or to punish breaches of the 
peace.”211 
Throughout his terms, Washington sought to prosecute those who 
violated the rights of Indians.  In March of 1791, after denouncing James 
O’Fallon for violating Indian treaties and the Indian Intercourse Act, 
Washington promised rigorous prosecutions of those who violated the 
law.212  Hoping that making an example of O’Fallon would deter his 
followers, Jefferson wrote to the Kentucky district attorney, instructing him 
to prosecute only O’Fallon.213  Similarly, in December of 1792, 
Washington proclaimed that he would punish those who had murdered 
Cherokee Indians and had burned down a Cherokee town.214  His 1793 
State of the Union address noted with satisfaction that his administration 
had prosecuted the Cherokee’s attackers.215 
The president’s instructions were not limited to the criminal arena.  
When it appeared that a suit against William Bingham was properly 
regarded as a civil suit against the United States, Washington—on the 
advice of the secretaries of state and treasury and the attorney general—
directed the district attorney for the Massachusetts district to appear on Mr. 
Bingham’s behalf.216  Evidently, all three of these powerful officers thought 
that the president could direct the district attorney to defend Mr. Bingham 
and, thereby, defend the United States. 
 
 211 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to District Attorneys in Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina (Nov. 29, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 456; see also Letter to Thomas Jefferson from 
Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 30, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 
460.  Jefferson had made similar promises to the previous French minister who had sought 
the assistance of the executive in another law enforcement context.  See Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (Nov. 9, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra, at 603 (noting that the Georgia district attorney would help prosecute an American 
accused of stealing slaves from the Island of Santa Domingo); see also Letter to Matthew 
McAllister, District Attorney of Georgia (Nov. 9, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra, at 599 (same). 
 212 Proclamation of March 19, 1791, in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 
supra note 200, at 250. 
 213 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Murray, Kentucky District Attorney 
(Mar. 22, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 598. 
 214 Proclamation of December 12, 1792, in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 260-61. 
 215 Fifth Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 163, 167. 
 216 See Letter of George Washington to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 27, 1793), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw320311)) 
(Washington acquiescing to the recommendation of secretaries of treasury and state and the 
attorney general that district attorney of Massachusetts should be ordered to represent 
Bingham).  Bingham was being sued for his actions as representative of the United States in 
Martinique in 1779.  Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. 19, 20 (1795).  For an explanation of why 
Bingham was sued by a private party, see Bingham, 3 U.S. at 21. 
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Apart from directing the district attorneys in their representation of the 
United States, Washington also had government attorneys assume other 
executive tasks.  For instance, Washington “directed” the attorney general 
to “instruct” the district attorneys to “require from” the port collectors 
information about neutrality infractions, presumably with a view to 
prosecuting such infractions.217  When there were allegations that a French 
consul had rendered judgments on the legality of captures, Secretary of 
State Jefferson ordered the Maryland district attorney to ascertain the truth 
and report back to him.218  Similarly, at Washington’s behest, Jefferson 
supplied “instructions” to all the district attorneys on how to handle capture 
disputes.219  Upon hearing of an arrest of a ship by the local governor, the 
district attorneys were to notify the parties of the arrest and ask that they 
appoint arbiters to determine whether the capture occurred within the 
territory of the United States.220  If the parties could not agree to appoint 
“referees,” the district attorney was to take depositions and transmit them 
to the president for final decision.221 
Washington not only directed the district attorneys, he also directed his 
attorneys general.  In particular, Washington asked the attorneys general on 
several occasions to help the district attorneys in their representation of the 
United States.222  The events leading up to Hayburn’s case also confirm 
presidential control of the attorney general.  The Supreme Court refused to 
hear a case brought by the attorney general in his official capacity because 
they were unsure whether the president had authorized the attorney 
general’s actions.223  While the Court was wrong to suggest that the 
attorney general needed the president’s explicit approval for each of his 
acts, it is quite significant that the Court would not let him proceed without 
first inquiring as to whether Attorney General Randolph’s actions were 
 
 217 Letter from Tobias Lear to Thomas Lowrey (May 9, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF  
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 455 n.35. 
 218 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Zebulon Hollingsworth (Nov. 14, 1793), in 27 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 374. 
 219 See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to the District Attorneys (Nov. 10, 1793), in 27 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 338-40 (with instructions); see also  
Letters from Thomas Jefferson to Foreign Ministers in the United States (Nov. 10, 1793), in 
27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 340-42 (noting that district attorneys had 
instructions to notify agents of France and England and to take depositions when the parties 
chose not to use arbiters); Letter to George Hammond (Nov. 10, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 342-43 (same). 
 220 See supra note 219. 
 221 See id. 
 222 See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1795) (Attorney General 
William Bradford noting in litigation the president’s motives for intervening); Letter from 
Washington to the Attorney General (Oct. 1, 1792), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 200, at 171-72. 
 223 Bloch, supra note 18, at 602; Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A 
Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527 , 534-41. 
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consistent with presidential wishes.  Despite the president’s lack of 
statutory authority to direct the attorney general’s work before the Supreme 
Court, the Court evidently thought it obvious that the president could direct 
the attorney general. 
Washington’s direction of the federal attorneys is interesting for many 
reasons.  First, Washington’s control was wide ranging and complete.  He 
directed their actions when it came to criminal and civil matters, cases with 
foreign and domestic implications, and controversies relating to tax and 
treaties.  In directing prosecutions and in discontinuing them, there 
apparently was no law enforcement area that Washington regarded as off 
limits. 
Second, as noted earlier, no statute authorized his administration’s 
control of district attorneys.  Washington did not have the statutory 
authority to direct Attorney General Randolph, Secretary of State Jefferson, 
or Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton regarding prosecution.  Moreover, 
none of these officers enjoyed statutory power to supervise or control the 
district attorneys.  And, of course, Washington lacked statutory 
authorization to direct the district attorneys himself. 
Third, the lack of controversy is noteworthy.  While the 
administration’s underlying policies were often attacked, and while some 
people certainly disagreed with his prosecutorial choices,224 apparently no 
one regarded Washington’s direction of the district attorneys as 
problematic.  Obviously, Randolph, Jefferson, and Hamilton regarded 
Washington’s direction as appropriate, else they would not have facilitated 
his control by conveying his instructions.  Moreover, in his proclamations 
and in his addresses to Congress, Washington conspicuously notified the 
nation that he had ordered prosecutions, thereby suggesting that 
Washington did not regard his control as open to debate in the least. 
Washington’s control triggered no firestorm because the country 
understood that Washington’s control was authorized.  The Constitution 
granted Washington all the authority he needed.  Indeed, he cited his 
constitutional power to execute the law or his duty to execute the law in 
 
 224 For instance, James Monroe wrote to Jefferson criticizing the prosecution of 
American citizens who accepted commissions in the French military by the Washington 
administration.  Letter of James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1793), in 29 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 208, at 383-84.  Yet Monroe never questioned 
that Washington could direct prosecutions.  See id.  Instead, his claim was that the American 
citizens had violated no law.  See id.  While acknowledging that there was some doubt about 
the propriety of prosecution, Jefferson nonetheless defended the prosecution as necessary to 
enforce the peace treaty with England.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe 
(July 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 501-02.  Indeed, he 
pointedly noted that even if the prosecution was unsuccessful, “the Executive will have 
acquitted itself” towards England.  Id. at 502.  This comment suggests that Jefferson 
regarded the prosecution decision as the executive’s and not the individual decision of some 
statutorily independent prosecutor. 
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several of his public pronouncements as justification for his law 
enforcement measures. 
b. John Adams 
President John Adams’ direction of the district attorneys had a 
decidedly partisan tinge.  Adams, with the assistance of his Secretary of 
State, Timothy Pickering, used the Sedition Act of 1798 to punish critics of 
his administration.  Apparently, Pickering personally reviewed Republican 
newspapers225 and ordered district attorneys to investigate or prosecute the 
publishers.226  For instance, Pickering reported to Adams that William 
Duane, the publisher of the Republican newspaper Aurora, had published 
an “uninterrupted stream of slander on the American government” by 
insinuating that the English had bribed members of the Adams 
administration.227  Adams wrote back “[i]f Mr. Rawle[the district attorney 
in Pennsylvania] does not think this paper libelous, he is not fit for his 
office; and if he does not prosecute it, he will not do his duty.”228  
Subsequently, Pickering notified Adams that a prosecution was under way 
and that Rawle was to examine the Aurora and “institute new prosecutions 
as often as [Duane] offends.”229 
Perhaps the most revealing prosecution stems out of the alleged 
defamation of the Senate by the same William Duane of the Aurora 
discussed above.  On May 14, 1800, the Senate resolved that President 
Adams “be requested to instruct the proper law officer to commence and 
carry on a prosecution against William Duane, editor of the newspaper 
called the Aurora, for certain false, defamatory, scandalous, and malicious 
publications, in the said newspaper . . . tending to defame the Senate of the 
United States, and to bring them into contempt and disrepute, and to excite 
 
 225 JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 88 (1951). 
 226 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 407-
08 (1948) (noting two requests by Pickering to district attorneys to initiate prosecutions of 
four people); see also MILLER, supra note 225 (“Of all United States District Attorneys, 
Pickering demanded close scrutiny of Republican newspapers .published in their districts 
and prompt prosecution of offenses, even of seditious matter copied from another 
newspaper.  In such cases, he asked that immediate notice be given the Department of State 
in order that prosecution might also be commenced against the original publisher.”).  But see 
WHITE, supra, at 408 (claiming that, while “Pickering was more ready than [his 
predecessor] to urge on the district attorneys in particular cases, . . . his letters were not put 
in terms of orders”). 
 227 Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (July 24, 1799), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 3-4 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1854). 
 228 Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (Aug. 1, 1799), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 5. 
 229 Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (Aug. 1, 1799), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 7. 
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against them the hatred of the good people of the United States.”230  Not 
surprisingly, Adams obliged his Senate allies, writing to the Pennsylvania 
district attorney and the attorney general as follows: “In compliance with 
this request [by the Senate], I now instruct you, gentlement, to commence 
and carry on the prosecution accordingly.”231  The Senate and Adams 
clearly believed that the president could direct the district attorneys in their 
prosecutions.232 
Like Washington, Adams also ordered prosecutions discontinued.  
Before a Sedition Act trial of newspaper editor Ann Greenleaf, Adams 
ordered the prosecution discontinued.233  Pickering had previously directed 
the local district attorney to prosecute the paper’s editors if any libel 
appeared in its pages.234  The district attorney soon garnered enough 
material to indict Ms. Greenleaf.235  But the offending paper subsequently 
ceased publication, and the Federalists were worried that Ms. Greenleaf 
made a sympathetic victim.236  Accordingly, the district attorney suggested 
to Pickering that the prosecution be dropped.237  Pickering referred this 
recommendation to Adams, who “agreed that the reasons urged were ‘quite 
sufficient for me to consent and indeed to direct a Nolle prosequi.’”238  This 
direction was relayed to the district attorney and the prosecution was 
dropped.239  Likewise, when John Daly Burk, a newspaper editor, agreed to 
leave the country if his prosecution was discontinued, the district attorney 
relayed the offer to Pickering, who relayed it to Adams.240  Adams accepted 
the offer and ordered Burk’s prosecution discontinued.241 
Adams’ control of prosecutions was not confined to Sedition Act 
prosecutions.  Like Washington, Adams understood that prosecutions often 
had foreign policy implications.  When a British minister complained that 
 
 230 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 184 (1800). 
 231 Letter from John Adams to the Attorney General and the District Attorney of 
Pennsylvania (May 16, 1800), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 56. 
 232 At least some members of the House also thought the president had the authority to 
direct prosecutions.  See 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 202 (1814) 
(containing motion to request president to instruct the Attorney General to prosecute 
Vermont governor Chittenden tabled); see also 5 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES at 414 (1806) (passing resolution that condemned Samuel Ogden and 
William Smith for complaining that executive officials had encouraged their illegal 
activities and then prosecuted them). 
 233 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at415. 
 234 Id. at 399-400. 
 235 Id. at 400. 
 236 Id. at 415. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 217. 
 241 Id. at 217-18. 
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two American privateers had boarded his ship and had opened his private 
letters, Adams wrote directly to John Davis, the Massachusetts district 
attorney, and ordered him to “make inquiry into this transaction and . . . 
make report to me . . . .”242  Adams further noted that because he intended 
to demand satisfaction for all injuries done to Americans, sound policy 
demanded that he “do all in [his] power to give satisfaction when insults 
and injuries are committed by American citizens on British subjects, by 
punishing the authors of them.”243  Shortly thereafter, Adams (somewhat 
redundantly) ordered Pickering “to refer this business to the attorney of the 
district . . . with instructions to make a diligent inquiry, and strictly to 
prosecute the persons he may find guilty of any breach of the law of 
nations.”244  Though the prosecutions proved unsuccessful, the incident 
once again revealed Adams’ control of the district attorneys. 
While Adams’ ingloriously exercised his control of the district 
attorneys to harass those who hounded him, his actions confirm that the 
president was understood to have constitutional authority to control the 
district attorneys.  As before, no statute authorized presidential direction of 
the district attorneys.  Moreover, though Democrats inveighed against the 
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, apparently no one 
complained that Adams’ frequent instructions to the district attorneys were 
similarly unconstitutional or illegal.  Indeed, the Senate itself had assumed 
the constitutional propriety of presidential direction of the district attorneys 
when it made its prosecution request to John Adams rather than to the 
district attorney directly. 
c. Thomas Jefferson 
As author of the Kentucky Resolves, resolutions critical of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, Thomas Jefferson famously regarded these Acts as 
unconstitutional.  Upon assuming office, President Jefferson was 
determined to treat the Sedition Act as a nullity.245  To that end, he 
pardoned those convicted of violating the Sedition Act.  But extending 
pardons to only those actually convicted of violating the Act would not end 
 
 242 Letter from John Adams to John Davis, District Attorney of Massachusetts (June 
19, 1799), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 659; Letter from John 
Adams to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State (June 19, 1799), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra, at 658 n.1. 
 243 Letter from John Adams to John Davis, District Attorney of Massachusetts (June 
19, 1799), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 659. 
 244 Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State (July 20, 1799), 
in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 227, at 668. 
 245 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 12, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 57-58; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 57 
(“I affirm that act to be no law, because in opposition to the constitution; and I shall treat it 
as a nullity, wherever it comes in the way of my functions.”). 
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its lingering effects.  While the Sedition Act had expired the day before 
Jefferson took his oath of office, the Act provided that its expiration would 
not terminate ongoing prosecutions of alleged offenses that occurred prior 
to its expiration.246 
Rather than granting pardons to the accused, Jefferson ordered the 
district attorneys to halt ongoing prosecutions.  Specifically, when 
Jefferson entered office, a prosecution of William Duane of the Aurora was 
pending.  Consistent with his resolve to treat the Sedition Act as a nullity, 
Jefferson ordered the district attorney to cease any Sedition Act 
prosecutions of Duane.247  Nonetheless, out of a regard for the Senate, 
Jefferson simultaneously ordered the district attorney to institute a new 
prosecution of Duane on whatever grounds might be available.248  Since the 
Senate had earlier requested a prosecution of Duane by the Adams 
administration (while Jefferson was the president of the Senate),249 
Jefferson wanted to oblige the Senate’s request as much as possible.  The 
new prosecution stalled after the grand jury refused to indict, presumably 
because there was no other federal law that Duane might have violated.250 
Two friendly printers wrote to Jefferson asking him to provide the 
grounds for his actions in Duane’s case, so that they might better defend 
him against attacks.  Jefferson wrote to Edward Livingston and asked him 
to reply to the printers.  Jefferson provided the substance of the justification 
himself, which is worth quoting in full: 
The President is to have the laws executed.  He may order an 
offence then to be prosecuted.  If he sees a prosecution put into a 
train which is not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued and 
put into a legal train . . . .  There appears to be no weak part in any 
of these positions or inferences.251 
Whether Jefferson was relying upon his grant of executive power or 
upon his faithful execution duty is unclear.  What is certain is that his 
defense is the most clear presidential exposition of the executive’s 
authority to control prosecutions.  Consistent with the doctrine of 
presidential control of law execution, Jefferson apparently admitted of no 
exceptions to his view that the president could both order the 
commencement and the cessation of prosecutions. 
 
 246 Section 4 of the Act provided that “the expiration of the act shall not prevent or 
defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offence against the law, during the time it shall 
be in force.”  Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 76, § 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597. 
 247 See supra note 245. 
 248 See id. 
 249 See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra note 245. 
 251 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33. 
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Throughout his two terms, Jefferson acted on his understanding of 
presidential control over prosecutions.  Shortly after writing to Livingston, 
Jefferson wrote to Albert Gallatin, the Treasury Secretary, to “approve” of 
a prosecution in a case involving a schooner called Sally.252  Later, when 
Jefferson became aware of federal common law prosecutions for libel, he 
immediately ordered that the prosecutions be stopped, for he believed that 
federal libel prosecutions were unconstitutional.253  Fortunately, the district 
attorney had already decided to stop prosecuting and for the same reasons 
given by the president: the president’s “obligation to execute what was law, 
involved that of not suffering rights secured by valid laws, to be prostrated 
by what was no law.”254  Presumably Jefferson meant that his obligation to 
execute the law did not encompass the execution of some federal common 
law of libel, which stood in opposition to the Constitution’s First 
Amendment. 
Like his predecessors, Jefferson typically did not dictate how the 
prosecution ought to be carried out.255  When he became involved in a 
proceeding, he was usually content to give general directions to prosecute 
or not, wisely leaving the details to the district attorneys.  But on one 
famous occasion, Jefferson did much more.  In the infamous trial of his 
first vice president, Aaron Burr, Jefferson “proceeded relentlessly to 
mobilize executive resources to prove the preconceived guilt [of Burr].  
Jefferson . . . acted himself as prosecutor, superintending the gathering of 
evidence, locating witnesses, taking depositions, directing trial tactics, and 
shaping public opinion as if judge and juror for the nation.”256  Jefferson’s 
directions are amply revealed in the numerous letters he wrote over the 
course of the proceedings.257  Jefferson even told District Attorney George 
 
 252 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 28, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 106. 
 253 See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 253-54. 
 254 Id. at 254. 
 255 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 12, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 106 (describing that the strategy for the 
case was “not given by way of instruction to the Attorney, because it was presumed [it] 
would occur to him, and we did not choose, by prescribing his line of procedure exactly, to 
take on ourselves an unnecessary responsibility”). 
 256 LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 71 (1963). 
 257 See generally Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay (May 20, 1807), in 9  
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 52; Letter of Thomas Jefferson to 
George W. Hay (May 26, 1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 52; 
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay (May 28, 1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 52; Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay (June 2, 
1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 53; Letter of Thomas Jefferson 
to George W. Hay (June 12, 1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 55; 
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay (June 19, 1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 58; Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay (Sept. 7, 
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Hay to proceed against Burr’s co-conspirator’s should trial events warrant 
further prosecutions.258  Tellingly, Chief Justice Marshall criticized the 
executive for its tardiness in adducing evidence of Burr’s guilt,259 thereby 
tacitly noting that Jefferson was responsible for Burr’s prosecution. 
Finally, recognizing the importance of the district attorneys, Jefferson 
removed several district attorneys who had been too zealous in prosecuting 
alleged violations of the Sedition Act.260  Jefferson viewed these removals 
as absolutely crucial to his goal of putting law execution back on the proper 
track.261  Significantly, there was no statutory authority for these removals. 
Hence, Jefferson must have understood his authority as emanating from the 
Constitution itself.  Just as the Constitution authorized Jefferson to direct 
official prosecutors, it also empowered him to remove them when their 
prosecutions were likely to be contrary to Jefferson’s law enforcement 
policies. 
D. The Presidents and Their Official Prosecutors 
The evidence from the first three presidential administrations bespeaks 
of a bipartisan, tri-branch consensus that the president could direct 
governmental lawyers in their representation of the United States.  Despite 
the lack of statutory authority, presidents directed the district attorneys and 
the attorney general in all matters, large and small.  Presidents ordered 
prosecutions commenced and halted, sometimes doing both in the same 
case!  Presidents also ordered official prosecutors to represent the civil 
interests of the United States.  The presidents believed that, since they were 
in charge of law enforcement and because law enforcement encompassed 
prosecution, they were empowered to control official prosecutors. 
The district attorneys and the attorneys general apparently agreed 
because they never contested the legality of presidential instructions.  
Indeed, at least some acknowledged that they were under the president’s 
control.  For instance, Richard Harrison, the New York District Attorney, 
acknowledged that he labored under Washington’s control.262  Harrison 
 
1807), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 63. 
 258 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George W. Hay, District Attorney for Virginia 
(June 19, 1807) in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 58 (advising 
Hay to charge with “treason or misdemeanor, as you think they evidence will support”). 
 259 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 14-15 (C.C.D. Va. 1806) (No. 14,692). 
 260 See Carl Russell Fish, Removal of Officials by the President of the United States, in 
1 Annual Report of the American Historical Association 65, 70 (1899) (listing three clear 
removals by Jefferson of district attorneys and suggesting a fourth as well); see also Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Mar. 24, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 32 (discussing removal of some district attorneys for 
“prosecuting their fellow citizens with the bitterness of party hatred”). 
 261 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Mar. 24, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 245, at 30-32. 
 262 Extract of a letter from Richard Harrison to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 3, 1795), in 1 
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mentioned but one exception to the general rule that he acted on his own 
accord in prosecuting: when he was “honored with the directions of the 
Chief Executive Magistrate.”263  Similarly, Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph, in contending that he could represent the United States before 
the Supreme Court without the express consent of the president, 
nonetheless acknowledged that he worked for the president.264  Though the 
Constitution vested the executive power with the president, it did not 
require presidential approval for every instance of law execution.265  Still, 
the constitutional power gave the president “general superintendence over 
all, which he unquestionably has.”266  Clearly, both Harrison and Randolph 
regarded themselves as subject to presidential direction.  To my 
knowledge, no district attorney or attorney general ever defied a president’s 
prosecutorial directions.267 
The district attorneys and the attorneys general consistently followed a 
pattern of obedience rather than defiance.  But were they truly executive 
officers?  Some have suggested that the contrast between the war and 
foreign affairs departments, which Congress designated as executive 
departments, and the lack of such a designation for the government 
attorneys indicated that the latter group of officers were not executive 
officers.268  Professor Bloch has suggested that the creation of the attorney 
general reveals a pragmatic streak on the part of Congress, for she believes 
that Congress did not a regard the attorney general (and presumably the 
district attorneys) as executive officers that required “comprehensive 
presidential control.”269  Rather, according to Bloch, “Congress appeared to 
believe that the Attorney General would take orders from Congress, as well 
as the President . . . .”270 
Too much has been made of the presence or absence of the “executive” 
label in early organic statutes.  Despite the lack of the executive tag, the 
treasury department was clearly regarded as an executive department.271  
 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 626-27 (1833). 
 263 Id. at 627. 
 264 Marcus & Teir, supra note 223, at 537. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. (quoting Justice James Iredell’s notes of the argument by Randolph). 
 267 It is possible that some attorneys conceived themselves as free agents but followed 
the president’s instructions because they chose to exercise their supposed statutory freedom 
to conform to the president’s agenda.  This possibility seems unlikely for several reasons.  
First, there is no evidence of government attorneys claiming statutory independence but 
nonetheless adhering to presidential direction.  Second, though the presidents were quite 
open in their direction of the district attorneys, it appears as if no attorney, member of 
Congress, or judge ever regarded the president’s control as ultra vires. 
 268 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 30-31. 
 269 Bloch, supra note 18, at 582. 
 270 Id. at 581. 
 271 Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 18, at 804 (listing 
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The same is true for the official attorneys and the attorney general.  The 
most powerful piece of evidence is the fact that the president routinely 
directed these officers in their official duties.272  Additionally, the president 
and his immediate subordinates regarded these government attorneys as 
executive officers. 
Far from doubting the president’s power, the other two branches 
understood that the president had constitutional power to direct 
prosecutions.  Hence, the Senate notoriously requested President Adams to 
direct a district attorney to prosecute William Duane.273  Likewise, Justices 
of the Supreme Court sought evidence from the attorney general that his 
work before them had been authorized by the president, thereby indicating 
their understanding that, as a matter of constitutional law, the attorney 
general labored under the president’s directions.274 
To be sure, the presidents did not routinely direct the official 
prosecutors.  They apparently did not approve of every prosecution; nor did 
they even monitor every official prosecution.  But their restraint was likely 
not based on a reading of the Constitution or some statute.  Rather there 
were prudent reasons to avoid such micromanagement.  In an era of 
difficult communications, it would have been extremely challenging to 
communicate detailed instructions in a timely manner.  Trials would have 
been delayed, with sometimes harmful consequences.  Moreover, it would 
have been positively counterproductive for presidents to micromanage their 
official prosecutors.  To begin with, the presidents appointed these 
attorneys (or let them remain in office), and hence, they were the 
president’s men.  To constantly second guess the attorneys’ decisions 
would have shown too little faith in the initial appointment.  Finally, such 
oversight might have led the most qualified attorneys to resign, for few 
men of wisdom and competence would gladly remain in a post where they 
exercised no real discretion.  The strategy followed was the best: appoint 
good officers and leave most matters to their wisdom and judgment.  
Intervene only when weighty matters of state were involved or where 
constitutional duty (faithful execution of the laws) required. 
Could presidents abuse this supervisory power?  Of course.  In 
directing the district attorneys to prosecute his critics, President Adams 
arguably did just that.275  But no one argued that the presidents lacked the 
power to direct official prosecutors.  Instead, opponents of the president 
directed their criticisms to the substantive policies themselves: enforcement 
 
reasons why the treasury department was an executive department). 
 272 See supra Part II.C.4. 
 273 See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text. 
 274 See Marcus & Teir, supra note 223, at 535 (discussing Hayburn’s Case and stating 
that “the crucial question for the Supreme Court was . . . whether [the attorney general] 
could proceed without specific authorization from the President”). 
 275 See supra Part II.C.4.b. 
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of neutrality in the absence of a federal statute making violations of 
neutrality illegal, enforcement of the Sedition Act to suppress speech, etc.  
Hence, even though there was no shortage of criticism of these 
administrations, critics apparently never charged these presidents with 
usurping discretionary authority granted to the district attorneys or the 
attorneys general. 
Before concluding the discussion of official prosecutions, two more 
challenges to the chief prosecutor theory must be addressed: the use of state 
prosecutors to prosecute violations of federal law and the assertion that 
prosecution was regarded as both a judicial and executive function.  Upon 
closer examination, neither has much substance. 
1. State Prosecution of Federal Offenses 
As noted earlier, Professor Krent has suggested that early presidents 
did not have effective control over prosecutions because they could not 
control state prosecutors who prosecuted federal offenses before state 
courts.276  In highlighting the potential consequences of state execution of 
federal law for the theory of the unitary executive, Professor Krent has 
good company.  In Printz v. United States,277 Justice Scalia cited the 
independence of state executives from the president as an ancillary reason 
why Congress could not commandeer state executives into enforcing 
federal law.278 
There are several problems with Professor Krent’s argument.  To begin 
with, the laws providing for state court jurisdiction of federal offenses did 
not expressly empower state prosecutors to charge federal offenses.279  
They merely permitted state courts to hear these cases.  These statutes 
hardly sound like either an invitation or a command to the state prosecutors 
to prosecute federal offenses.  In contrast, when Congress clearly wanted 
state and federal officers to have concurrent jurisdiction, Congress was 
explicit.  For instance, the Judiciary Act expressly authorized state court 
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases.280  For all these reasons, it seems 
 
 276 Krent, supra note 18, at 309. 
 277 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 278 Id. at 905-07. 
 279 See Krent, supra note 18, at 306 (“Although Congress was silent as to whether 
criminal cases were to be tried by a federal or state prosecutor, at least some prosecutions 
were initiated and carried out by state officials.”). 
 280 See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (explicitly providing for 
concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some cases).  Although one could embrace the 
theory that state officers have the ability to enforce federal law except where Congress 
clearly precludes them from doing so, I do not believe that this theory predominated in 
1789.  Even though statutes of the era said nothing about concurrent state enforcement of 
federal law, I do not believe people of the era concluded that state officers had general 
authority to enforce federal law given the lack of an express prohibition.  Still, more 
research about state enforcement of federal law would be necessary to draw definitive 
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likely that Congress did not mean to and, in fact, did not authorize state 
prosecution of federal offenses. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 strengthens this conclusion.  Having created 
district attorneys for the entire United States, Congress may have thought 
that the district attorneys were the only officers (federal or otherwise) who 
could prosecute on behalf of the United States.  Indeed, because district 
attorneys had geographical jurisdiction to prosecute offenders (they were 
not tied to the federal courts),281 one might conclude that when Congress 
permitted federal cases to be heard in state courts, the district attorneys 
were the only officials meant to try federal offenses in state courts.  The 
district attorneys had jurisdiction in “all” civil and criminal cases where the 
United States was a party,282 at least suggesting that state officials lacked 
the same authority. 
In any event, even if state prosecutors were authorized to enforce 
federal laws, it is not at all obvious that the president would lack 
constitutional authority to direct state prosecutors, as Krent assumes.283  
While the president may not remove state prosecutors from their state 
offices or employment, his lack of such authority does not prove that he 
lacks the authority to direct state prosecutors in their execution of federal 
law.  Nor does it prove that he cannot “remove” or withdraw their power to 
enforce federal law.  If the president has the power to direct federal 
prosecution and the state prosecutors engage in federal prosecution when 
they prosecute offenses against the United States in state courts, then the 
president may control their prosecutorial activities that are, in reality, 
conducted on his behalf.  If they refuse to follow his directions, the 
president must be able to “remove” the power to enforce federal law from 
these state prosecutors.  In other words, he must be able to forbid them 
from continuing to enforce federal law in opposition to his instructions, or 
else these state employees have a share of the executive power. 
Presidential control of state officers was hardly unprecedented in this 
era.  Glenn Phelps argues that when state governors helped enforce the 
Neutrality Proclamation or other presidential proclamations, they did so in 
subordination to the chief federal executive.  He concludes that “[w]here 
enforcement of the laws of the federal government was concerned, 
 
conclusions. 
 281 District attorneys were not attached to particular courts; instead they had power to 
bring cases in their respective districts.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. at 92 
(providing that “there shall be appointed in each district [a district attorney] . . . to act as 
attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful 
execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for 
crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil 
actions in which the United States shall be concerned”) (emphasis added). 
 282 Id. 
 283 See Krent, supra note 18, at 303-10. 
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Washington firmly believed that governors were constitutionally 
subordinate to the president.”284  Whether the state governors were required 
to assist the executive is a difficult question.  But having chosen to do so, 
they could not act as if each of them was the federal government’s chief 
executive and direct enforcement of federal law (using state resources) in 
whatever manner they saw fit.  They had to conform to the president’s 
views about the execution of federal law, or they had to desist in their 
federal law enforcement efforts.  What is true for the governors should be 
true for any state prosecutor as well. 
The Constitution itself suggests that state executive officers must act in 
subordination to the president when called into federal service.  As a matter 
of constitutional law, when called into national service, officers of the state 
militias undoubtedly must follow the directions of the national commander-
in-chief.285  If the president may direct the state militias when called into 
national service, it seems natural that he should be able to direct state 
prosecutors in their prosecution of federal offenses.286  Thus, when 
Congress either permits or requires state executives to enforce federal law, 
these state executives become the auxiliaries of the president and are 
subject to his control. 
In short, there is no evidence that early Congresses actually authorized 
state prosecutors to prosecute federal offenses; that if Congress did so, that 
Congress meant these prosecutors to prosecute independent of the chief 
executive’s control; or that the Constitution would have permitted Congress 
to grant autonomy to state executives in their execution of federal law.  To 
the contrary, what we know from Presidents Washinton and Jefferson 
suggests conclusions opposite to the ones drawn by Professor Krent.  
Recall that Jefferson maintained that the president must be able to stop 
unlawful prosecutions and set them on a “legal train.”287  Although uttered 
in the context of controlling district attorneys, Jefferson’s logic applies 
equally to prosecutions commenced by state attorneys. 
 
 284 GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 132 
(1993). 
 285 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”). 
 286 To be fair to Professor Krent, I know of no instance where a president directed a 
state prosecutor.  But by the same token, Professor Krent cites no instance where such 
power was denied by a state prosecutor, a president, or anybody else.  Moreover, since we 
do not know what share of prosecutions of federal law were brought by state officials, we 
cannot say whether this category was so minor that there was little occasion or need for 
presidential control. 
 287 See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
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2. Judicial Prosecutions 
Recall Professor Gwyn’s suggestion that prosecution was as much a 
judicial function as it was an executive one.288  He based his conclusion on 
a number of claims, including that in some state constitutions, the sections 
dealing with judiciaries authorized the creation of an attorney general, that 
the creation of federal attorneys occurred in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and 
that early versions of the Judiciary Act provided for judicial appointment of 
federal prosecutors.289 
There is little doubt that prosecution and judging are intertwined.  
Without someone to bring a case before the courts, there can be no judging.  
Likewise, without a judge, executives cannot enforce most penalties.  But 
this close relationship does not mean that prosecution is somehow a judicial 
task.  As Professor Gwyn recognizes, at one time the broad category of law 
execution generally encompassed both prosecution and judging.290  But by 
1789, even though judging was still part of the overall task of law 
execution, Americans viewed judging, in part, as a check on the 
executive’s law enforcement.291  This was a legacy of English law, and it 
was reinforced by Montesquieu’s maxim.  So while judges executed the 
law when they exercised the judicial power, their judicial function occupied 
only a narrow part of the much larger category of law execution.292  Judges 
decided cases brought to them; they did not generally decide which cases 
ought to be brought before them. 
Professor Gwyn also overstates evidence of the “judicial” nature of 
prosecutions.  Although judges may have appointed prosecutors under 
some early state constitutions,293 this appointment structure does not make 
prosecution itself a judicial task anymore than presidential appointment 
makes judging an executive task.294  If the Judiciary Act had permitted 
judicial appointment of district attorneys and the attorney general, it would 
 
 288 Gwyn, supra note 18, at 493-94. 
 289 Id. at 493-95 
 290 Id. at 477. 
 291 See 1 CHARLES S. HYNEMAN & DONALD S. LUTZ, The Essex Result, in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 495-96 (1983) (“That the legislative, 
judicial, and executive powers, are to be lodged in different hands, that each branch is to be 
independent, and further, to be so ballanced, and be able to exert such checks upon the 
others, as will preserve it from a dependence on, or an union with them.”). 
 292 Steve Calabresi and Joan Larsen have argued that the division between executive 
and judicial power was rather uncertain at the time of the founding.  Steven G. Calabresi & 
Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of 
Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1162-77 (1994).  There were many who regarded 
the judiciary as part of the executive; this could be confusing given that the judiciary also 
was regarded as a check on the executive. 
 293 See Gwyn, supra note 18, at 495-96 (discussing the judiciary’s appointment of 
prosecutors in the Tennessee and Connecticut constitutions). 
 294 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause). 
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not follow that these officers would be exercising judicial power in their 
representation of the United States before courts.  They would still be 
helping the president exercise his executive power of prosecution and 
would still be under his control and subject to his removal.295  The same 
observation applies to reading too much into the juxtaposition of judicial 
power and attorneys general in state constitutions and in the Judiciary Act.  
Grouping the government attorneys and the judges in state constitutions 
and the Judiciary Act296 does not make prosecution a feature of the judicial 
power.  More likely, the two positions were grouped together precisely 
because consideration of one naturally leads to a discussion of the other. 
There were, of course, some notorious instances where judges 
seemingly “prosecuted” individuals.  Some federalist judges zealously 
enforced the Alien and Sedition Acts to the point of encouraging grand 
jurors to indict opposition publishers.  The articles of impeachment against 
Justice Samuel Chase are replete with unflattering comparisons to public 
prosecutors and common informers,297 suggesting that, in the views of the 
drafters of the articles, Justice Chase had stepped over the line and had 
become Prosecutor Chase.298  Indeed, the articles of impeachment accused 
Chase of “authoritatively enjoin[ing]” the district attorney to find some 
means of prosecuting a publisher.299  Apparently, many members of the 
House viewed judicial prosecutions as so improper and outside the scope of 
the judicial power that its practitioners should be impeached. 
To regard prosecution as part of the judicial power in any way, shape, 
or form, is to nullify one of the Constitution’s central features—its judicial 
safeguard against prosecutorial overreach.  To regard prosecution as at least 
as much judicial as it is executive is to overlook one of the central features 
of Anglo-American separation of powers, namely the separation of the 
executive and the judicial powers. 
E. The Constitutional Structure of Official Prosecution 
Here we consider the latitude that Congress and president have with 
respect to structuring federal prosecution.  Congress has tremendous 
 
 295 Even if cross-branch appointments are constitutional (a thorny question to be sure), 
it does not follow that the president lacks authority over those officers charged with 
executing the law, however they might be appointed.  Greene, in his discussion of the 
colonial prosecutors, noted that colonial chief executives could direct the prosecutors even 
when others had appointed the prosecutors.  See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 296 See Gwyn, supra note 18, at 494-95. 
 297 8 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 668-69 (1805) (accusing Chase of trying to coerce the 
grand jury to indict and accusing him of directing the district attorney to supply evidence of 
alleged Sedition Act violations). 
 298 See id. at 668 (stating that Chase’s actions were “degrading his high judicial 
functions, and tending to impair the public confidence in, and respect for, the tribunals of 
justice”). 
 299 Id. 
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freedom in creating a prosecutorial substructure.  As discussed below, 
Congress need not create a hierarchical, all-encompassing department of 
justice headed by an attorney general.  Instead, consistent with overall 
presidential control, Congress may carve up federal prosecution in any 
number of ways.  What Congress cannot do is forbid presidential control of 
any prosecutorial discretion. 
While the president must work with the prosecutorial substructure that 
Congress erects, the president likewise has great freedom.  Though the 
president may intervene in prosecutions conducted on his behalf, the 
Constitution does not compel him to supervise every official prosecution.  
So long as he remains true to his faithful execution duties, the president can 
grant official prosecutors a measure of autonomy. 
1. Must Congress Create Official Prosecutors? 
Before addressing contemporary issues, it is appropriate to consider a 
largely theoretical question about Congress’s power over structuring 
prosecution.  Thus far, this Article only contends that the Constitution 
grants the president the power to control official prosecutions.  But in light 
of this constitutional understanding, may Congress elect not to create 
official prosecutors? 
Nothing in the Constitution requires that Congress create official 
prosecutors.  Just as Congress can render the commander-in-chief authority 
temporarily meaningless—by eliminating the Army and Navy and by never 
permitting the president to call forth the militia—so too can Congress make 
aspects of the chief executive power temporarily futile.  The president 
probably can prosecute offenders himself; as the constitutional executor of 
the laws, the president may always don the prosecutorial mantle.  But for 
all intents and purposes, Congress may effectively emasculate the 
executive power by deciding not to support the executive power’s law 
execution.  Without subordinate prosecutors and funds, the chief prosecutor 
will be impotent, for though armed with a constitutional power to 
prosecute, he will have no effective means for carrying this power into 
execution. 
Good reasons exist why Congress has always supplied official 
prosecutors to the president.  The foremost is that, in frustrating the 
president’s executive power, Congress simultaneously hobbles itself.  
While sometimes members of Congress pass laws for no other reason than 
to boast that Congress has tackled some issue, other times members of 
Congress hope and expect that their laws actually will be executed.  If 
Congress does not create official prosecutors dedicated to exacting 
penalties for violations of the law, Congress can expect that execution of its 
laws will suffer.  For reasons mentioned above, Congress cannot expect 
much law execution from a solitary chief prosecutor. 
For different reasons, popular prosecutors can never be a perfect, or 
56
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 30 [2005]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art30
PRAKASH_ME 2/22/2005  5:05 PM 
2005] The Chief Prosecutor 1757 
even an adequate substitute for official prosecutors.  First, private rather 
than public interests motivate popular prosecutors.  Driven by a desire to 
feather their nests, popular prosecutors will rarely (if ever) take the more 
diffuse and often complicated public interest into account.  Nor will they be 
moved by mercy or the interests of justice to refrain from prosecution.  
Instead, popular prosecution will usually be a function of a private cost-
benefit calculus.  Second, because Congress has more leverage over official 
prosecutors than private popular prosecutors, it reduces its own influence if 
it effectively grants members of the public an exclusive right to prosecute.  
While official prosecutors are the president’s mouthpieces, Congress pays 
their salaries, funds their prosecutions, conducts hearings on their conduct, 
and, in extreme cases, may impeach and convict them.  With popular 
prosecutors, Congress perhaps lacks a similar array of carrots and sticks. 
2. Centralization of Prosecutorial Authority: The Possibility of 
Attorney(s) General 
Notwithstanding the president’s constitutional power to control 
prosecutions, Congress has a free hand in designing the prosecution 
substructure under the president.  Nothing in the Constitution requires 
appointment of an executive officer entitled “attorney general” or an 
executive officer who superintends most, if not all, official prosecutors.300  
Instead, Congress may choose to leave prosecutorial control solely in the 
hands of the president and leave it to the president (and perhaps White 
House staff) to monitor prosecutors and their decisions.  Because for 
almost a century Congress did not grant any statutorily created officer 
general authority over the prosecutors, Congress apparently made this very 
choice.301 
It follows that the recurring protests of attorneys general over the past 
two centuries that they lack complete control of the representation of the 
United States are not of constitutional dimension.302  There undoubtedly are 
compelling policy reasons for statutory centralization in the hands of one 
person who is in turn subordinate to the president.  But no constitutional 
rule requires that these sound reasons be heeded.  Contrary to the perennial 
wishes of attorneys general, Congress might choose to structure 
prosecution in any number of ways: two attorneys general, one civil and 
one criminal; three attorneys general, one civil, one criminal, and one in 
 
 300 The office of “attorney general” is provided for not in the Constitution, but in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (“And there shall 
also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United 
States . . .”). 
 301 Congress did not empower any statutory officer to superintend the actions of all 
district attorneys until 1861.  See Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. 
 302 See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 18, at 585-87. 
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charge of “official” misconduct; regional attorneys general, etc.303  And of 
course, Congress can continue its policy of centralizing criminal 
prosecutions in one institution (the department of justice) and fragmenting 
civil prosecutions across many institutions.  The one constitutional 
minimum is that, however the Congress decides to structure prosecution, 
the president must be able to control all prosecutorial discretion. 
All this means that attempts to explore early understandings of 
presidential power over federal prosecutions by examining the attorney 
general’s statutory authority (or lack thereof) over the district attorneys are 
besides the point.  One cannot hope to find the limits of the president’s 
constitutional power by examining the Judiciary Act’s limited grant of 
authority to the attorney general.  While Attorney General Randolph’s 
authority over the district attorneys was limited, President Washington’s 
authority apparently was not. 
3. Independent Prosecutors 
Constitutional history reveals that the president has constitutional 
authority to control official prosecutors by virtue of his executive power.  
Contrary to the claims of revisionist scholars, early federal statutes are 
most certainly not evidence for the proposition that the Congress can make 
prosecution independent of the president because those statutes never were 
so understood.  At the same time, these early federal statutes, and the 
subsequent practices, cannot be read as somehow establishing that 
Congress is incapable of limiting presidential control over prosecution.  
Because the issue of limiting presidential control of prosecution apparently 
never came up, these statutes do not rule out the possibility that the 
president’s control of prosecution is a default power granted by the 
Constitution but modifiable by Congress. 
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, constitutional text and structure 
reveal that the idea of a default prosecutorial power has little to commend 
it.  Nothing in the Article II Vesting Clause suggests that it grants power 
subject to congressional modification.  The Vesting Clause does not read 
like the Appointments Clause or like the Article III grant of authority to 
Congress to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, 
both of which explicitly make powers or rights subject to congressional 
alteration.  Moreover, if the Necessary and Proper Clause is a license to 
treat the Executive Power Clause as a default grant, there is no reason to 
treat the president’s other constitutional powers as any more sacrosanct.  
Under the guise of enacting necessary and proper laws, the Congress could 
modify or abridge all of the president’s powers—the veto power, the treaty 
power, the pardon power, etc.  Though it grants broad authority to 
 
 303 Here I am using “attorney general” in the sense of an officer who superintends 
other attorneys. 
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Congress, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit the Congress to 
extinguish the executive power under the guise of “carrying [it] into 
Execution.”304  There are little grounds to suppose that this is the best (or 
even a plausible) reading of the Constitution. 
Hence, though Congress may refrain from creating official prosecutors 
and though it may create any number of prosecutorial substructures, the 
better view is that Congress may not create independent officers designed 
to carry into execution presidential powers.  Prosecution is a presidential 
power, no less so than the powers to veto legislation or to pardon federal 
offenders.  It follows that official prosecutors cannot be made independent 
of the president, the chief prosecutor. 
By this standard, the independent counsel statute was unconstitutional.  
Even though the Ethics in Government Act never expressly bars 
presidential direction of the independent counsel, Congress clearly sought 
to insulate prosecution from presidential control through the Act’s bar on 
department of justice control over the independent counsel.305  
Notwithstanding the sincere motives that led Congress to enact the Ethics 
in Government Act, Congress can no more create an independent counsel 
than it could create an independent general or an independent 
ambassador.306 
Though the independent counsel provisions have expired, there is a 
more common, yet seemingly less troubling, phenomena of independent 
official prosecutions of civil law violations.  Congress has been able to 
shield these officers from executive control by exploiting the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Humphrey’s Executor.307  In Humphrey’s Executor, the 
Court upheld Congress’s limitation on the president’s removal powers over 
commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission.308  The case more 
generally concluded that Congress can constrain presidential removal and 
control where the offices Congress creates require the exercise of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers.309 
Admittedly, there is a certain logic to this.  Perhaps the Constitution is 
best read as not permitting the president to exercise complete dominion 
 
 304 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 305 See 28 U.S.C. 594(i), 597(a) (2000) (discussing independent counsel’s 
independence from Department of Justice).  But see supra note 11 (discussing John 
Manning’s interesting claim that the independent counsel could be removed for defying 
presidential instructions). 
 306 Admittedly, there is a textual difference with respect to generals.  The president has 
explicit commander-in-chief authority, whereas he apparently lacks explicit chief executive 
authority.  Yet this misreads the Constitution.  There is ample evidence that the president 
was regarded as the chief executive (sometimes he was called the Supreme Executive 
Magistrate instead) and that the president was to superintend federal executive officers. 
 307 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 308 Id. at 631-32. 
 309 Id. at 629. 
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over officers who actually exercise legislative or judicial power (assuming, 
for a moment, that this accurately describes the Federal Trade 
Commissioners at issue in Humphrey’s Executor).  But the Constitution 
clearly establishes that the president controls the executive power and, 
therefore, prosecution.  Just because Congress may be able to shield quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial tasks from executive control does not mean 
that Congress also can shield officers who help exercise the executive 
power.  And Congress should not be able to shield officers from 
presidential control merely because Congress decides to create hybrid 
officers who exercise multiple powers of government.  After all, when 
Congress creates hybridized officers, it affirmatively chooses to commingle 
the three authorities of government in the hands of commissioners rather 
than separately vesting each authority in a distinct officer or set of officers.  
Congress should not be able to strip away the president’s power over law 
execution merely because it would like to create an officer charged with 
exercising all three powers of government. 
There is a solution that satisfies Congress’s desire for creating offices 
that exercise the three powers of government without unconstitutionally 
stripping the president’s law execution power.  Assuming that Congress 
constitutionally can create officers who exercise more than one of the three 
powers of government,310 the president must be able to control such 
officers in their exercise of executive power.  If the president wishes the 
SEC to alter its enforcement priorities, its commissioners and prosecutors 
must heed his desires because their authority to execute the laws ultimately 
derives from the executive and not Congress.  In demarcating their offices, 
Congress merely permits these officers to execute the laws.  The president 
is the only entity who can actually authorize their law execution.  In 
executing the law, these commissioners and prosecutors must be the 
president’s eyes and ears. 
If the SEC commissioners and prosecutors defy the president’s law 
enforcement priorities or instructions, the president must be able to retract 
their prosecutorial authority.  It is the president’s power of law execution 
that the commissioners and prosecutors are helping to carry into execution.  
If they are not carrying into execution the president’s executive power, then 
the president may bar them from executing the law.  This constitutional 
power of selective removal (removal of executive authority and not actual 
removal from office)311 ensures that the president retains the power to 
 
 310 The Constitution implicitly might forbid having more than one power exercised by 
the same institution by vesting the three powers of government in different institutions.  In 
other words, if the Constitution mandates separated powers, Congress cannot combine them.  
Under this view of the Constitution, Congress cannot create officers exercising more than 
one power of government. 
 311 Admittedly, the selective removal power appears unprecedented.  Historically, the 
executive power could eject the person from the office and not strip away, in a piecemeal 
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control federal law execution.312 
None of this counters the weighty policy arguments against 
presidential involvement in the prosecution of presidential allies and 
political enemies.  But we should not be surprised that the Constitution 
resolves some difficulties (the need for vigorous, efficient, uniform, and 
responsible law execution) only by creating others.  There should be no 
doubt that the chief prosecutor will face conflicts of interest in 
prosecutorial decisions and that he can abuse his power.  President Adams 
faced conflicts of interest in prosecuting his opposition, and there were 
likely many who view him as having abused his authority. 
But these difficulties are not unique to the prosecutorial power.  The 
Constitution is replete with such conflicts of interest.  Congress decides its 
own budget313 and which laws will apply to its members.314  The judiciary 
frequently decides cases that determine the powers, rights, and jurisdiction 
of the courts.315  And the president can pardon his associates and friends.316  
Nothing about the potential for prosecutorial abuse requires us to be 
especially fearful of the prosecutorial power. 
Moreover, there are constitutionally authorized means of checking 
prosecutorial abuses: vigorous congressional oversight coupled with a 
willingness to impeach and convict errant executive officials, including the 
president.  Instead of looking for a means to evade or subvert the grant of 
executive power to the president, the House should make more frequent use 
of its limited (yet significant) executive power of prosecution and try 
impeachment cases before the Senate.  As my colleague Michael Rappaport 
has argued, impeachment investigations are the means by which Congress 
(and the nation) should expect to uncover and sanction executive 
 
fashion, the powers employed by an officer.  Yet, the selective removal power is itself a 
response to an unprecedented innovation—the creation in the late 19th century of officers 
exercising more than one power of government.  Assuming that Congress can create such 
officers, Congress ought not be able to strip away portions of the executive power in the 
process.  Selective removal allows Congress to enjoy one innovation (vesting multiple 
powers of government in one institution) without permitting its unconstitutional innovation 
of carving up the executive power. 
 312 While the president may not have the constitutional power to direct these 
independent agency officers in their nonexecutive tasks, nothing said here precludes 
Congress from granting such power to the president.  The point is that the president must 
have power to control exercises of executive power, not that he must (or must not) have 
power to control exercises of legislative or judicial power. 
 313 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.1 (appropriations power). 
 314 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.”).  See generally U.S. CONST. art I (granting Congress the power to create and 
pass laws). 
 315 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law in Equity . . . .”). 
 316 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the president “shall have Power to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States . . .”). 
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wrongdoing, including prosecutorial misconduct.317 
4. The Constitutionality of Prosecutorial Autonomy 
The president has the constitutional authority to control prosecutors by 
virtue of the executive power, and he has a constitutional duty to ensure the 
faithful prosecution of alleged law breakers.  Consistent with these 
provisions, what, if anything, may the president do to alleviate legitimate 
concerns about the politicization of prosecutions and prosecutorial self-
dealing? 
Even if he were inclined, a president cannot grant official prosecutors 
complete independence.  If the president did not have a faithful execution 
duty, perhaps the president could permit the complete independence of 
official prosecutors.  Standing alone, the grant of executive power arguably 
does not compel the president to enforce any law, and, hence, he might 
choose not to exercise his power to control the enforcement of a law, just as 
the president may choose not to veto bills or not to pardon.  But the faithful 
execution duty constrains his ability to grant freedom to prosecutors.  
Though the Faithful Execution Clause does not require the president to 
review each and every prosecutorial decision,318 it does require the 
president to take appropriate measures when he discovers unfaithful law 
execution. 
Even though the Faithful Executive Clause arguably requires a 
minimum level of presidential superintendence, the Clause likely permits 
the president to grant prosecutors broad autonomy in their decision making. 
An earnest and honest president would stay within the bounds of the 
Constitution if he told his prosecutors, “until I learn of the possibility of 
unfaithful prosecutions on your part, you can prosecute my friends, allies, 
and officers with impunity.  Moreover, until I learn of possible 
prosecutorial shirking, I will not review your decisions not to prosecute my 
opponents.” 
While some superintendence measures are appropriate, presidents have 
good reason not to micromanage their officers’ execution of the law.  By 
 
 317 See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, Replacing Independent Counsels with 
Congressional Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595 (2000) (advocating the replacement 
of the independent counsel statute with congressional oversight and investigation of 
executive officials). 
 318 Though the Faithful Execution Clause requires the president to try to ensure faithful 
execution, it does not require him to superintend every act of law execution, which would be 
impossible.  The Clause should not be read to require the impossible.  More generally, 
deciding whether the president has satisfied his faithful execution duty seems to require a 
circumstantial inquiry.  For instance, Washington was much more watchful than a 
contemporary president ever could be.  There were far fewer officers to supervise.  In an era 
of millions of federal employees, modern presidents cannot be held to Washington’s 
supervision standard. 
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avoiding presidential micromanagement, the president is able to focus on 
other matters and also to retain the interest of highly qualified and skilled 
prosecutors.  Paradoxically, though the president has the power to control 
official prosecutors, few things might make the chief executive weaker than 
using that power to the fullest extent and becoming an overbearing, 
meddlesome president. 
The revisionist account of the president’s relationship to prosecution 
has little to commend it.  As even some of the revisionists have admitted, 
text and structure have always pointed towards presidential control.  And 
history, it turns out, provides no safe haven for the revisionist account 
either.  History actually reveals a consistent practice of chief executive 
control of official prosecutors extending from England, to the colonies, and 
to the states.  The Continental Congress presumed the legitimacy of chief 
executive control when it repeatedly requested state chief executives to 
instruct state attorneys to prosecute those hostile to federal interests. 
Rather than creating a nationwide system of independent district 
attorneys, as revisionists have suggested, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
established a system of prosecutors who labored under presidential control.  
The first three presidents directed the district attorneys on numerous 
occasions, commanding the attorneys to commence and halt prosecutions.  
And this control was understood to flow from the Constitution itself, for the 
Judiciary Act never authorized presidential control and the presidents 
themselves justified their direction by reference to the Constitution.  
Significantly, though presidential control was quite public and often 
controversial, few claimed that the control was unlawful or unauthorized.  
In fact, the other branches seemed to understand that the Constitution 
granted the president the authority to control representation of the United 
States in court.  In short, the district attorneys were not precursors of the 
independent counsel, each able to prosecute as he saw fit and free of the 
chief prosecutor’s control.  Rather each was the chief prosecutor’s 
instrument in implementing his executive power of prosecution and in 
satisfying his faithful law execution duties. 
III. Presidential Control of Popular Prosecutions 
Some scholars might conclude that the textual, structural, and 
historical arguments discussed in Part II not only establish presidential 
control of official prosecutions, but that they also bear out chief executive 
control of all prosecutions of federal offenses, whether brought by official 
or private parties.  Of course, others will regard these arguments as perhaps  
showing (or tending to suggest) that the Constitution authorizes presidential 
control over official prosecutors only.  Because popular prosecutors 
represented the United States in court, however, perhaps early presidents 
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really could not control all prosecutions of federal offenses.  As noted 
earlier, early Congresses authorized numerous popular actions,319 whereby 
private parties could bring suits on behalf of the United States.  Successful 
private parties garnered a portion of any court ordered fine or forfeiture, 
with the remainder going to the treasury.320  If private parties independent 
of the executive could prosecute suits on behalf of the United States, it 
simply cannot be the case that early presidents could control all 
prosecutions.  Instead, as many have argued, when Congress authorized 
popular actions, complete executive control of prosecution became 
impossible.321 
Supporters of the chief prosecutor thesis lend credence to the claim 
that early Congresses authorized independent popular actions.  Believing 
that popular actions pose a challenge to the theory of the unitary executive, 
such scholars tend to argue that popular actions must be unconstitutional.322  
The Executive Power Clause wholly precludes the creation of popular 
actions because all of the executive power belongs to the president alone, 
they argue.323  Moreover, the Faithful Execution Clause implies that 
popular actions must be unconstitutional because it would be impossible 
for the president to ensure faithful execution if individuals could bring suits 
independent of presidential control.324  Finally, popular actions violate the 
Appointments Clause because only officers of the United States may 
prosecute on behalf of the United States, and citizens who bring popular 
actions are not officers.325  Hence, despite their existence since the 
Constitution’s earliest days, popular actions are unconstitutional.326 
This assertion is a little hard to stomach.  Popular actions were not an 
innovation of 1789; rather, they are part of our English patrimony.327  For 
centuries, popular actions, warts and all, were the principle means of 
enforcing English penal laws.  The government harnessed the ample 
 
 319 As noted earlier, the phrase “popular actions” refers to those actions, criminal and 
civil, that citizens could bring on behalf of the crown.  In return for bringing the suit, the 
popular prosecutor would receive a statutorily set portion of the fine. 
 320 See supra notes 21-22 . 
 321 See Krent, supra note 18, at 300 (noting that popular prosecutor “unquestionably 
participated in setting federal criminal law policy”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 21. 
 322 See, e.g., Blanch, supra note 22, at 767-68; Lovitt, supra note 22 at 855-56. 
 323 Lovitt, supra note 22, at 876-79. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Blanch, supra note 22, at 736-47. 
 326 Under this view, early popular actions are the structural Constitution’s counterpart 
to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  Just as many recognize that the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were unconstitutional, so too must we concede the unconstitutionality of the early popular 
action provisions. 
 327 See generally JOHN L. J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICES OF THE CROWN (1964); 
PENDLETON HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND: A STUDY IN LAW ADMINISTRATION 
(1981). 
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avarice of informers to enforce the law.  Indeed, professional informers 
sprang up to prosecute their fellow citizens in return for portions of fines.328  
Moreover, the system gave criminal associates an incentive to turn on each 
other in the hopes of securing a pardon and a portion of a fine.329  Popular 
actions made it more difficult for criminals to stay true to the idea of honor 
amongst thieves.330 
The crown might have used its absolute veto to thwart legislation 
creating popular actions.  Yet the crown apparently did not do this.  To the 
contrary, the crown likely valued popular actions.  Popular actions helped 
enforce the laws by inflicting penalties on wrongdoers and also by serving 
to deter potential wrongdoers.331  Moreover, the system surely saved on 
crown outlays because there was a diminished need to pay governmental 
lawyers to enforce English laws.  Instead, the public helped the crown 
enforce the laws.332  Perhaps most important, popular actions helped the 
crown collect fines and forfeitures.333  To be sure, the crown only received 
a portion of the funds collected rather than the whole sum.  Yet, the crown 
very well might have believed that net revenues were higher under a 
system of popular actions as compared to a costly, nationwide system of 
governmental investigators and prosecutors.  For all these reasons, the 
crown likely viewed popular actions as a help rather than a hindrance. 
Does English and early American history oblige us to accept the 
constitutionality of independent popular actions brought by citizens, each 
able to bring suits on behalf of the United States and answerable to no one?  
Not at all.  Contrary to the views of some, English and early American 
popular actions do not prove that Congress can authorize citizens to bring 
popular actions independent of presidential control.  Although the case for 
executive control of popular actions is not as compelling as the case for 
executive control of official prosecutions, considerations of text, structure, 
and history strongly favor presidential control. 
As noted, constitutional text and structure support the notion that the 
president must be able to exercise ultimate control over all popular actions.  
As we saw earlier, the Article II Vesting Clause grants the president the 
right to control law execution, including prosecutions.  If independent 
popular actions were constitutional, each independent popular prosecutor 
would have a share of the executive power.  Structurally, the Founders 
established a unitary executive to ensure uniform and responsible law 
 
 328 J.J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 120 (1979). 
 329 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 40-42, 138 (1957). 
 330 Id. at 53. 
 331 Id. at 142-47. 
 332 See id. 
 333 Id. 
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execution.334  Independent popular actions imperil these values because 
each popular prosecutor will establish her own enforcement policies and 
will be accountable to no one for their law execution choices. 
What type of control over popular actions must the president retain?  
Consistent with the grant of executive power, the president must be able to 
terminate popular actions using either a pardon or a nolle prosequi.  When 
the president can terminate popular prosecutions, he remains in possession 
of the executive power because he can ensure that prosecutions reflect his 
law enforcement priorities and principles.  He also can prevent popular 
prosecutors from bringing unfaithful prosecutions. 
Obviously, a president might pardon the subject of a popular 
prosecution when the president believes the prosecution is unwarranted or 
unnecessary.  For instance, a pardon would be appropriate when the 
president strongly believes that the target of the popular prosecution is 
innocent of the charged offenses.  Alternatively, the executive might 
pardon a target of a popular prosecution because she has cooperated in an 
ongoing law enforcement investigation.  Finally, the executive might 
pardon the target of the popular action for nothing more than a promise to 
refrain from further violations of the law. 
A nolle prosequi is the executive’s determination that the United 
States does not wish to continue prosecuting someone.  Entering a nolle 
prosequi before a court permits the executive more flexibility than a 
pardon, because a nolle does not bar future prosecutions for the same 
offense.335  A nolle is valuable in situations where the president does not 
believe a prosecution is currently warranted but wishes to leave open the 
possibility of a future prosecution.  For instance, the president might 
believe that there currently is insufficient evidence to warrant a popular  
prosecution of someone.  But the president might want to revisit the 
question at some later date, when the evidence of wrongdoing might be 
more substantial.  In this scenario, the president would nolle the popular 
prosecution, leaving open the option of a new official prosecution.  
Alternatively, the president might prefer the nolle option when the 
president believes that a prosecution is warranted but concludes that the 
popular prosecutor will do a poor job of prosecuting.  After entering the 
nolle, the president immediately can institute a new suit using official 
prosecutors and thereby ensure faithful law execution. 
The idea of a terminable popular prosecution has English roots.  The 
crown could enter a nolle prosequi on criminal informations brought by 
private citizens.336  The nolle prosequi completely halted the information 
 
 334 See supra Part II.A-B. 
 335 See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 394 (1975) (discussing when 
Double Jeopardy Clause attaches). 
 336 See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
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and left open the possibility of subsequent official prosecution.337  The rule 
with respect to qui tams was less proexecutive, however.  The English 
judiciary concluded that once a qui tam relator had commenced his suit, the 
crown could only nolle prosequi or pardon its share of the fine and could 
not excuse or release the portion sought by the prosecuting relator.338  
Nonetheless, because the crown could exercise partial control over qui tam 
actions and absolute control over informations, the crown clearly enjoyed a 
good deal of authority over popular actions.339 
Nothing in early federal statutes undermines the case for terminable 
popular prosecutions.  To date, scholars have concluded that these statutes 
somehow forbade executive control.  Yet these statutes were completely 
silent on the issue of executive control of popular actions.  The strong 
founding consensus that the president controlled law execution strongly 
suggests that this statutory silence is better understood as permitting 
executive termination of popular actions. 340 
Construing silence as forbidding presidential control is particularly 
problematic in this context.  Neither the Judiciary Act nor any other act of 
Congress granted the president the power to direct or remove district 
attorneys.341  Nonetheless, as we have seen, early presidents exercised these 
powers.342  No federal statute conferring these powers was necessary 
because the president had such authority by virtue of the Constitution.  The 
same could be said about the statutes creating popular actions.  These 
statutes did not need to authorize presidential termination of popular 
actions because the Constitution already established the baseline of 
presidential control of prosecution. 
A. Text and Structure 
Arguments here largely mirror the earlier ones in favor of presidential 
control of official prosecutions.  The Article II Vesting Clause not only 
grants the President the power to execute the law, it also authorizes the 
President to control the execution of federal law.  As Madison argued 
during the removal debate, those officers who help execute the law must 
exercise their authority in submission to the wielder of executive power.343  
Likewise, if Congress decides that members of the public may enforce the 
law on behalf of the United States, their law enforcement must occur under 
 
 337 See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 338 See id. 
 339 See id. 
 340 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 341 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93. 
 342 See supra Part II.C.4. 
 343 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 394, 500 (1789) (arguing that the president must have the 
power to remove executive officers). 
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the control of the constitutional executor of the federal law, the president of 
the United States. 
Likewise, because the Faithful Execution Clause obliges the president 
to ensure faithful execution of federal law,344 the president should use his 
executive power to superintend popular actions.  Although Jefferson argued 
that the president ought to stop unlawful prosecutions in the context of 
discussing official prosecution, the logic of his argument applies regardless 
of the traits of the prosecutor.345  Suppose a qui tam informant sues a 
contractor on behalf of the United States, but there is no credible evidence 
that the contractor actually violated the law.  This suit arguably constitutes 
faithless law execution, and the president should use his executive power to 
stop the prosecution from going forward.  Or suppose the executive 
believes that the qui tam informant has conspired with the contractor and 
brought such a weak case that the contractor will be acquitted.  Using his 
executive power, the executive should take over the suit and put it “into a 
legal train,”346 lest the two colluding parties successfully thwart future 
government prosecution of the contractor’s illegal actions. 
The pardon power grants the president a blunt instrument of control 
over popular actions.  Though a relator or informer sues for herself as well 
as the United States, the private party has not suffered an injury or offense 
when she comes before the court;347 rather, in order to make her way into 
court, she must allege that the defendant has offended the United States.348  
Because the United States has suffered an offense when its laws are 
violated, the president, by virtue of the pardon power, has the ability to 
pardon the entire offense.349  A presidential pardon precludes an 
enforceable final judgment and, therefore, prevents the popular 
prosecutor’s receipt of any portion of the fine or forfeiture. 
Defenders of the constitutionality of independent popular actions 
might respond with a number of arguments.  First, these defenders might 
claim that, when members of the public bring popular actions, they do not 
“execute” the law at all.  As a matter of constitutional law, perhaps popular 
prosecutors “administer” the law when they seek to have the court impose a 
 
 344 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H[e shall take Care that the Laws are faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 345 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33; see also supra note 251 and accompanying 
text. 
 346 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33. 
 347 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-
73 (2000). 
 348 Id. at 773. 
 349 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (the president “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment”). 
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fine or forfeiture. 350  If popular prosecutors do not execute the law when 
they prosecute, popular actions never implicate the executive power or the 
Faithful Execution Clauses.  Such arguments seem rather feeble.  If official 
prosecutors help exercise the executive power and help execute the laws, 
then citizens do the same when they prosecute.  There is no evidence that 
the constitutional character of prosecution changes based on the 
prosecutor’s traits.  Because popular prosecutors execute the law when they 
prosecute on behalf of the United States, popular prosecutions necessarily 
implicate the Executive Power and Faithful Execution Clauses. 
Second, some skeptics of presidential control of popular actions might 
claim that, for a number of reasons, popular actions are only minor 
incursions into the executive’s power—a kind of constitutional damnum 
absque injuria.351  To begin with, a qui tam relator usually only prosecutes 
a particular offender under a particular statute.  Unlike an official 
prosecutor, the popular prosecutor does not have a roving commission to 
execute any one of thousands of federal laws.  Additionally, popular 
prosecutors may not have the financial wherewithal to serve as general 
prosecutors or to overwhelm defendants with lawyers and resources.  
Because popular prosecutors may be jurisdiction and resource constrained, 
it may seem that popular prosecutors cannot possibly weaken, in any 
meaningful way, the chief prosecutor’s general grip on prosecutions. 
Such arguments understate the constitutional stakes.  If a particular 
independent popular action is constitutional, everyone in the United States 
may prosecute as many people as violate the relevant statute and the ability 
to do so free of executive control.  Moreover, once one accepts the 
constitutionality of popular actions, nothing prevents Congress from 
creating popular actions across hundreds or thousands of federal statutes.  
Finally, while no private party can match the federal government’s 
resources, there are quite a few private parties who can risk a great deal in 
return for an even bigger payoff.  Indeed, when England had numerous 
popularly actionable laws, England developed a system of professional 
informers who were in the business of suing on behalf of the Crown.  In 
short, one ought not believe that independent popular actions are but a 
minor invasion of the executive power because if independent popular 
actions are constitutional, Congress can subject the president’s executive 
power to death by a thousand cuts. 
Third, defenders of independent popular actions might claim that the 
pardon power extends only to criminal offenses.352  If that is true, the 
 
 350 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 13 (raising doubts about whether the 
Founders meant to give the president control over the “administration” of the law). 
 351 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (7th ed. 1999) (defining damnum absque injuria as 
“[l]oss or harm for which there is no legal remedy”). 
 352 Caminker, supra note 22, at 371 (noting that the pardon power only extends to 
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pardon power does not permit the president to pardon offenses prosecutable 
by a civil qui tam action.  Yet the Supreme Court has held the pardon 
power extends to fines, penalties, and forfeitures.353  The Supreme Court’s 
conclusion seems correct, for whenever someone violates the law and the 
law provides for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture to be paid to the United 
States, the violator has committed an offense against the United States.354  
Whether an offense is designated criminal or civil is immaterial, for in 
either case, someone has committed an offense against the laws of the 
United States.355  Because popular actions seek penalties and forfeitures 
owed to the United States in consequence of offenses committed against 
the United States, the president may pardon any offense that might be 
pursued by popular action. 
The same considerations of constitutional structure that point to the 
unconstitutionality of independent official prosecutors also weigh against 
the constitutionality of independent popular actions.  As discussed earlier, 
the Constitution established a unitary executive to ensure uniformity and 
responsibility in law execution.356  These structural interests are 
undermined if Congress can create independent popular actions.  If 
independent popular prosecutors may prosecute offenses against the United 
States without regard to the president’s law enforcement policies, there 
likely will be no uniformity in national law execution.  For example, the 
president may instruct his subordinate prosecutors to take a soft line in 
enforcing a particularly harsh law.  Yet if independent qui tam relators can 
prosecute the same statute vigorously, the president cannot establish a 
 
criminal offenses and citing Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925), for that 
proposition). 
 353 Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 478 (1875) (“The pardon, in releasing the 
offence, obliterating it in legal contemplation . . ., removes the ground of the forfeiture upon 
which the decree rests, and the source of title is then gone.”) (involving a petitioner brought 
suit for restitution of his property confiscated as a result of a lower court decree after 
petitioner was subsequently pardoned from the offense giving rise to the decree). 
 354 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984 
189 (5th ed. 1984); W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 51-53 
(1941). 
 355 The Constitution uses “offence” in only two places: in Article I (Congress can 
define and punish “Offences against the Law of Nations”), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, 
and the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb”), U.S. CONST. amend V.  “Offences,” as used in Article I, 
would seem to cover both civil and criminal penalties, for it would be odd to think that 
Congress’s power with respect to violations of the law of nations was limited to imposing 
criminal sanctions.  Offenses as used in the Fifth Amendment would seem to refer to 
criminal offenses only, for only criminal offenses would encompass punishments that put 
life and limb in jeopardy.  Nonetheless, the usage in the Fifth Amendment does not mean 
that offenses can only encompass crimes.  Instead, the Amendment is best read as providing 
that, of the category of possible offenses, the double jeopardy prohibition only applies to 
those offenses that jeopardize life or limb. 
 356 See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text. 
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uniform law enforcement policy for the nation.  Because the popular 
prosecutor will prosecute whenever the expected private value of the suit 
exceeds the private costs, the popular prosecutor likely will ignore the 
president’s directions and the public policy considerations that underlay his 
directions. 
Responsibility also becomes diffused when every citizen has the power 
to execute the law.  One reason the founders opted for a unitary executive 
was to ensure that one executive would be accountable for law enforcement 
choices.  Indeed, as noted earlier, the founders rejected an executive 
council and multiple chief executives because these structures supposedly 
led to irresponsible law execution.357  As compared to an executive 
triumvirate or council, independent popular actions make the assignment of 
responsibility more difficult by several orders of magnitude.  Rather than 
crediting or blaming a single chief executive, the public must labor to 
identify individual popular prosecutors in order to apportion credit or 
blame.  Even if the public could identify individual popular prosecutors, 
these prosecutors, motivated purely by their own private interests, likely 
will be unconcerned about the public’s reaction.  Lacking leverage, the 
public can do little to sanction irresponsible and unfaithful popular 
prosecutors.358 
None of these arguments proves that popular actions are per se 
unconstitutional.  The problem with independent popular prosecutions lies 
not in their popular nature but in the independence they convey.  In 
contrast with independent popular actions, terminable popular actions 
(popular actions that the president may terminate) pose no executive power 
problems.  When the president can terminate popular prosecutions, 
Congress has not unconstitutionally subdivided the president’s executive 
power.  Instead, Congress has empowered private parties to help the 
president exercise his executive power.  If the president objects to a popular 
prosecution, he can seize control of the suit and either terminate it once and 
for all, or direct his official prosecutors to bring it under a proper legal 
train.359 
 
 357 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 358 Perhaps Congress might structure popular actions in order to replicate the benefits 
of a unitary executive.  If Congress can deputize the entire populace to enforce the law 
independent of the president, it presumably could authorize a smaller subset of the public to 
prosecute on behalf of the United States.  Putting aside Appointments Clause issues, 
Congress might authorize just one person, such as the loser of a presidential race, to bring 
popular actions.  Centralizing control of popular actions in the hands of someone other than 
the president highlights the constitutional difficulties of popular actions, for it would be 
clear that Congress had replaced the Constitution’s chief executive with a statutory chief 
executive, a kind of ersatz chief prosecutor. 
 359 At this point, it is necessary to say a few words about Appointments Clause 
objections to popular actions.  The Appointments Clause grants the president the power to 
appoint all officers of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate.  U.S. 
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There remains the important question of Congress’s constitutional 
authority to create popular actions.  As the discussion up until this point has 
hinted at, Congress cannot create independent popular prosecutors because 
it lacks constitutional authority to strip away the executive’s power of 
controlling law execution.  None of Congress’s powers over commerce, 
taxes, bankruptcy, etc., permit Congress to vest the executive power where 
it sees fit.  Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause would be of little 
avail because any such statute would not carry into execution any power of 
government, for no other constitutional provision sanctions the creation of 
independent popular prosecutors who wield portions of the executive 
power.  Finally, any such statute would be improper, as it would mete out 
the president’s executive power. 
Yet the Constitution arguably raises no bar to Congress’s creation of 
terminable popular prosecutions.  A sound case can be made that statutes 
authorizing terminable popular prosecutions (and citizen law enforcement, 
more generally) are just one of many permissible necessary and proper 
means for carrying into execution the president’s executive power.  Just as 
Congress can use its necessary and proper authority to create executive 
officers and departments, so too can Congress deploy its authority to 
authorize popular prosecutions terminable by the president.  Hence, while 
the Constitution does not authorize Congress to redistribute the executive 
power among an executive horde of millions, it arguably does permit 
Congress to authorize the use of the general public to help the president 
execute the law.360 
 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Congress, however, may vest the appointment of inferior officers 
with the president, the department heads, or the courts.  Id.  In Buckley v. Valeo, 474 U.S. 1 
(1976), the Supreme Court declared that commissioners of the Federal Election Commission 
had to be appointed by the president because they controlled the prosecution of federal 
offenses.  Id. at 140.  Many critics of popular actions have cited this case and argued that 
relators and informers must be appointed under the rubric of the Appointments Clause.  See, 
e.g., Blanch, supra note 22, at 736-47.  Since they are not, popular actions must be 
unconstitutional, or so the argument goes.  This Article takes no position on whether the 
Appointments Clause bars the current structure of popular actions.  If the Appointments 
Clause, however, does pose a fatal problem for existing popular actions, it might be possible 
to restructure them to satisfy these objections.  Perhaps the president could be given the 
authority to appoint popular prosecutors as inferior officers of the United States.  If the 
president had such authority, there would be no Appointment Clause objections to popular 
prosecutors. 
 360 For the most part, modern defenders of independent popular actions have focused 
on qui tams, which as noted earlier, are civil actions to recover debts owed the government.  
Yet, there is no reason to believe that Congress has the power to create civil popular actions 
(qui tams) and no power to create criminal popular actions (informations).  If Congress can 
parcel out civil law enforcement, nothing would bar Congress from likewise dividing up 
criminal law enforcement.  As noted earlier, the Constitution does not indicate that the 
president has a stronger grip on criminal law enforcement than on civil law enforcement.  
Rather, both areas are under his sway by virtue of his grant of executive power.  If Congress 
may nonetheless strip him of his control of civil law enforcement, there is no textual or 
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B. History of the Popular Action 
Critics of the chief prosecutor thesis have eschewed textual and 
structural arguments, preferring to make historical claims about popular 
actions.  As these critics are quick to point out, popular actions are part of 
our English heritage.  Even though American colonies and states utilized 
official prosecutors, they authorized popular actions.  Continuing the 
tradition, early Congresses enacted from five to fourteen popular actions 
statutes.361  Critics argue that if individuals independent of the federal 
executive could sue on behalf of the government, then the president’s 
control of prosecution was not complete.  The very prevalence of early 
popular actions supposedly proves that the founding generation did not 
read the Constitution as granting the president complete control of 
prosecution.362 
But the history of public prosecutions is hardly so one sided.  This 
subpart examines the popular actions themselves before turning to English 
and American judicial opinions.  Far from proving that the president lacked 
 
structural reason (arising out of Article II at least) why the Congress could not likewise 
grant every citizen the ability to help impose criminal fines and prison terms. 
 361 The different figures arise out of a dispute on how to characterize certain statutes.  
Five statutes contained express causes of action.  See Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 
102 (allowing informer to sue and receive half of fine for failure to file census return); Act 
of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same to Rhode Island); Act of July 20, 
1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (allowing private individual to sue and receive half of 
fine for illegally employing seamen without contracts or illegally harboring runaway 
seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38 (allowing private individual 
to sue and receive half of goods forfeited for unlicensed trading with Indian tribes); Act of 
Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person who discovers violation of spirits 
duties, or officer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue and receive half of penalty and 
forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt); cf. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 
Stat. 116 (allowing informer to bring criminal prosecution and receive half of fine for 
criminal larceny or receipt of stolen goods).  Another nine statutes provided a bounty to 
informers, but do not make clear whether the bounty was for a successful popular action (in 
which case the statute authorized a popular action) or was instead for informing authorities 
of a violation ultimately prosecuted by the government.  See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 
38, 1 Stat. 48 (giving informer a quarter of penalties, fines, and forfeitures authorized under 
a customs law); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 60 (same under a maritime law); 
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 44, 44-45 (giving informer full penalty paid by 
customs official for failing to post a fee schedule); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 55, 1 Stat. 
173 (same); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 60 (same under a maritime law); Act 
of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 69, 1 Stat. 177 (same under another customs law); Act of Sept. 2, 
1789, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 67 (providing informer half of penalty upon conviction for 
violation of conflict-of-interest and bribery provisions in Act establishing treasury 
department); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 215 (extending same to additional 
treasury employees); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat. 195, 195-96 (providing 
informer a portion of fines resulting from improper trading or lending by agents of Bank of 
United States); cf. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 4, 1 Stat. 153 (apportioning half of penalty 
for failing to deposit ship manifest to official who should have received manifest and half to 
collector in port of destination). 
 362 See Krent, supra note 18, at 300-03; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 20-21. 
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authority to supervise popular prosecutors, these sources suggest that the 
chief executive had substantial authority to terminate popular actions. 
1. The Early Federal Popular Actions 
Both sides of the scholarly debate on popular actions have read too 
much into the early federal popular actions.  Scholars have assumed that 
the failure to mention presidential control in the early popular actions 
indicates that Congress deliberately chose not to grant the president control 
over these prosecutions.  Scholars who oppose the chief prosecutor thesis 
have gone on to contend that these congressional choices indicate that the 
Constitution did not grant the president any control over popular actions. 
Yet there is no evidence to support either conclusion.  Although it is 
true that the popular actions never authorized presidential termination, 
neither did they bar such termination.  In fact, they said absolutely nothing 
about executive control or intervention.363  Statutory silence is a 
notoriously unreliable indicator of congressional intent.  As the Supreme 
Court recently observed, silence “normally creates ambiguity.  It does not 
resolve it.”364  Based on silence alone, one should not read these statutes as 
somehow denying the president the power to terminate popular actions. 
Moreover, advocates of presidential control believe that the president 
has control over law execution by virtue of the Constitution, regardless of 
whether statutes grant or confirm this authority.  Obviously, statutory 
silence is a poor indicator of what the Constitution grants the president, for 
Congress is not obliged to affirm the Constitution’s grants of powers to the 
other branches.  Indeed, one suspects that federal statutes rarely contain an 
affirmation of the president’s constitutional authority. 
It is particularly perilous to make assumptions about the meaning of 
statutes in the context of executive power.  We have seen that the Judiciary 
Act nowhere hinted that the president could control district attorneys.  
Similarly, the Judiciary Act nowhere provided that the president could 
remove district attorneys.  Nonetheless, the Act was certainly not regarded 
as somehow precluding presidential control and removal.  Instead, by 
virtue of their executive power, presidents could control representation of 
the United States and remove district attorneys.365 
Likewise, though the popular action provisions said nothing about 
presidential control, the background understanding of the executive nature 
of prosecutions suggests that the president could terminate popular 
prosecutions.  Arguably, the statutes said nothing about presidential control 
because nothing needed to be said.  Notwithstanding their silence, the 
president could halt popular prosecutions.  Because the president had a 
 
 363 See supra note 361 (describing statutes). 
 364 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002). 
 365 See supra Part II.C.4. 
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constitutional right to execute the law and was supposed to ensure uniform, 
prompt, and responsible law execution, the president had constitutional 
authority over all prosecutions, whether undertaken by government 
prosecutors or members of the public. 
More generally, we should construe the public prosecution provisions 
against the backdrop of common understandings about constitutional 
powers and constraints.  For instance, did the federal courts lack authority 
to dismiss collusive popular actions because the statutes said nothing on the 
matter?  If popular prosecutors could collude with the accused, they might 
agree that, in return for money, they would lose the case and thereby both 
cheat the Treasury and prevent official prosecutors from bringing a 
subsequent suit.  Given that collusive prosecutions were a notorious 
problem in England,366 it would be unwise to conclude that since the 
statutes never expressly conveyed this authority to the courts, the courts 
could not dismiss collusive popular actions.  Because, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the courts must always decide if they have a real case or 
controversy,367 the courts likely had this power regardless of whether the 
popular actions explicitly allowed courts to review prosecutions for 
potential collusion.  The point is that we ought not regard the popular 
action provisions as vitiating constitutional constraints or as undermining 
constitutional powers (such as the executive power) merely because these 
statutes said nothing about these constraints and powers. 
All in all, no one has adduced evidence that early Congresses meant to 
prohibit presidential termination of popular actions.  Statutory text provides 
no support, and no scholar has yet found any support from any 
congressional debates.  On the other hand, there is a tremendous amount of 
evidence that the president was empowered to control law execution, with 
no one suggesting that the president’s control did not extend to popular 
actions.  Given the background constitutional understanding, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that the early popular actions count as evidence of the 
constitutionality of independent popular actions. 
2. Executive Supervision of Popular Actions 
So much for the text of the early statutes.  What of actual practices 
under them?  The definitive survey of early federal popular actions has yet 
to be written.  We do not know how many federal prosecutions were 
brought in the early years.  Nor do we know what portion of these were 
popular actions.  Hence, we do not know how significant popular actions 
 
 366 Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 89 
(1972). 
 367 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 254-55 (1850) (holding that attempt to bring case 
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were in the overall scheme of law enforcement in the early years after the 
Constitution.  The Office of Legal Counsel has claimed that of thirty-five 
prosecutions brought under one colonial statute that permitted qui tams, 
only one was a qui tam action.368  But, of course, we have no way of 
knowing whether this pattern holds true across the many federal popular 
action provisions. 
Moreover, we do not know whether early presidents ever terminated 
(or unsuccessfully sought to terminate) popular prosecutions.  What 
accounts for the lack of evidence of attempted presidential termination of 
popular actions?  Obviously, one answer might be that presidents thought 
that they could not terminate popular prosecutions.  But other answers are 
possible, answers consistent with the view that independent popular actions 
are unconstitutional.  Perhaps there were so few popular actions that there 
were few opportunities for presidential termination.369  Or maybe the 
president might have had little or no policy difficulties with the majority of 
popular prosecutions (as was likely true with the vast majority of official 
prosecutions), and, hence, there was no need for termination of popular 
prosecutions.  Finally, there remains the possibility that certain popular 
prosecutions were not brought precisely because potential popular 
prosecutors understood that the president might terminate the popular 
prosecution. 
Lacking direct evidence about presidential termination practices (or the 
lack thereof), we must cast our net wider and examine British and 
American cases.  These authorities may help us flesh out the chief 
prosecutor’s relationship to popular prosecutions. 
a. English Practice 
English case law favored executive termination up to a point.  The 
crown could halt popular informations by entering a nolle prosequi when it 
believed the popular prosecutions were vexatious, or contrary to the 
crown’s law enforcement policy.370  In King v. Guerchy,371 the crown 
halted a popular prosecution of the French ambassador to England.372  In 
Rex v. Fielding,373 the crown prevented a popular prosecution of a justice of 
 
 368 See Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 207, 249 (1989). 
 369 See id. at 235-36. 
 370 Criminal Law – Nolle prosequi – Trial Court Has Power to Dismiss for Want of 
Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 996, 997 (1966); see also PENDLETON HOWARD, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 35 (1981) (describing how attorney general might nol-pros popular 
prosecution); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 107 (1980) (same). 
 371 The King v. Guerchy, 96 Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1765). 
 372 Id. at 316. 
 373 Rex v. Fielding, 97 Eng. Rep. 531 (K.B. 1759). 
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the peace.374  Such control made sense.  Because the crown was 
constitutionally responsible for law enforcement and because informers 
helped enforce the law, the crown could halt the informers’ suits.375  
Significantly, by entering a nolle prosequi, the crown preserved its right to 
commence a future prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.376  
Though the informer statutes did not explicitly authorize such crown 
control, the courts read these statutes against the background of executive 
control of prosecution. 
With respect to civil qui tam actions, the executive also had a 
substantial measure of control.  The crown could pardon any offense, even 
those enforceable by a qui tam action.377  The only limitation on the pardon 
power applied after commencement of the qui tam relator’s suit.  After the 
commencement of a qui tam suit, the crown could only affect its portion of 
the fine, by either pardoning the offense or entering a nolle prosequi with 
respect to its portion.378  Even though the qui tam relator might have a 
terribly weak case, the executive apparently could not terminate the qui tam 
relator’s inchoate interest in the fine or forfeiture.379  Under the qui tam line 
of cases, the relator’s interest in the case ripens upon commencement of the 
suit, such that the crown cannot obliterate it thereafter. 
The rationale for the divergent treatment is unclear.  While the 
executive apparently could halt a popular information in its tracks, with 
respect to qui tams, it could only prevent the popular prosecutor from 
pursuing the government’s portion of a fine or forfeiture.  One could 
imagine possible reasons for the disparate treatment.  Perhaps the courts 
distinguished criminal informations from civil qui tams, envisioning more 
control over the former.  Maybe qui tam relators were somehow regarded 
as having a more concrete, permanent interest in their portion of the fine or 
forfeiture.  Or perhaps courts concluded in the qui tam cases that the qui 
tam statutes implicitly meant to preclude executive termination (either by 
nolle or by pardon) once the relator began her suit.  Finally, one cannot rule 
out the possibility that the English courts were simply unaware of their two 
competing lines of cases. 
The question remaining is this: Which of these frameworks, English 
treatment of criminal informations or civil qui tams, ought to guide our 
analysis of the president’s executive power?  For several reasons, the 
information line of cases seems more fitting for the American Constitution.  
 
 374 Id. at 531-32. 
 375 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 21 (1958). 
 376 See HOWARD, supra note 370, at 35; Nolle Prosequi, supra note 133, at 574. 
 377 See supra note 375. 
 378 Dr. Foster’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1222, 1228-29, (K.B. 1715); Stretton v. Tayler, 78 
Eng. Rep. 395, 395 (K.B. 1589). 
 379 See supra note 378. 
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We know that the federal chief executive was supposed to control law 
execution.  We also know that executive control was supposed to ensure 
uniformity and responsibility.  The English information cases granted the 
executive the assistance of the public in law execution while still 
maintaining executive control.  Through nolle prosequis and pardons, the 
executive could decide how the laws could be best executed. 
In contrast, the qui tam cases do not fit with the Constitution’s vision 
of executive control of law execution.  To be sure, the executive retains a 
great deal of authority over qui tams in that the executive can stop the qui 
tam relator from suing for the fine/forfeiture to be paid to the United States.  
Yet the executive cannot completely control federal law execution because 
once the qui tam relator commences her suit, she has a right to continue to 
enforce the law, whatever the executive’s views.  This creates the potential 
for problems, where law enforcement objectives might be frustrated by the 
split in law enforcement authority.  The president will not be able to 
guarantee immunity from prosecution in return for cooperation if 
independent popular prosecutors can continue prosecuting.  Popular 
prosecutors also could prosecute the innocent, and the executive would be 
unable to halt the unfaithful prosecutions. 
More generally, we ought to be cautious about importing English 
constraints or exceptions to the executive power, when those limitations 
might be based on the principle of parliamentary supremacy.  Whether the 
crown was the proper prosecutor for all offenses depended not only upon 
tradition but also on the statutes that Parliament enacted.  If the English 
cases are best understood as cases interpreting the English qui tam statutes, 
so that the courts concluded that Parliament meant to constrain or abridge 
the crown’s executive powers, the limitations on executive control might 
not apply here.  Under our system of separated and shared powers, the 
legislative branch is not supreme.  Instead its powers are enumerated380 
and, in various ways, constrained.381  Hence, for Congress to carve up the 
executive power and, thereby, vitiate presidential control over prosecution, 
it must point to some constitutional authority.  As noted earlier, the better 
view is that presidential powers are not subject to legislative abridgement, 
for nothing in the Constitution authorizes generic reallocation of federal 
power.  Hence, while Congress has tremendous latitude in establishing a 
prosecutorial substructure, Congress lacks the power to create independent 
popular actions.382 
 
 380 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 381 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
 382 The chief prosecutor thesis contends that the president may control prosecutorial 
discretion.  The chief prosecutor thesis does not deny that Congress may shape and 
constrain prosecutorial discretion through its appropriations power and its powers to create 
the officers and departments that will prosecute under the president’s control, however. 
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In any event, the English cases show that the crown could exercise 
considerable control over popular prosecutions.  The popular prosecutor 
had no absolute right to sue to recover fines or forfeitures owed the 
government.  Before suit commenced, the crown could pardon an offense 
pursuable by popular action.  Once a popular prosecutor commenced her 
suit, the crown’s authority apparently varied depending upon the type of 
suit.  If an information, the crown could pardon or nol-pros and, thereby, 
preclude the entire popular action from going forward.  If a qui tam action, 
the crown could pardon or nol-pros the government’s portion of the fine 
but could not remit the qui tam relator’s portion of the suit. 
b. American Cases 
The Supreme Court has never decided the question of whether a 
pardon or a nolle prosequi can extinguish a qui tam relator’s portion of a 
fine or forfeiture once the relator has commenced suit.  The Court has held, 
however, that a nonprosecuting informer’s interest may be extinguished 
prior to the execution of a judgment and, thereby, suggested that the 
president may terminate a popular prosecutor’s interest even after the 
prosecutor commences its suit.383 
In a series of cases decided in the wake of the Civil War, the Court 
adopted reasoning that suggests that qui tam relators might not have an 
unqualified right to their portion of the fine until the court orders 
distribution of the fine.  In the Confiscation Cases,384 the Court held that an 
informer who had provided information leading to a successful official 
prosecution had no absolute right to the fine until he actually received a 
portion of the fine.385  Among many reasons for its conclusion, the Court 
emphasized that the informer was not a party to the suit and was not 
entitled to be heard.386  While this case must be distinguished from a 
popular action, the Court offered a number of rationales why the president 
must be able to prevent informers from receiving their portion of the fines, 
rationales that apply equally to popular prosecutors. 
The Court likewise adopted broad reasoning in the case of Osborn v. 
United States.387  Osborn received a pardon after the district court issued a 
judgment that he would have to forfeit his property due to his support of 
the rebellion.388  Officers of the court collected the funds and kept the share 
of funds they were entitled to under the statute.389  Nonetheless, the Court 
 
 383 See infra notes 387-393. 
 384 Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868). 
 385 Id. at 462. 
 386 Id. 
 387 Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875). 
 388 Id. at 475-76. 
 389 Id. 
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held that the pardon entitled Osborn to receive all the funds garnered from 
the officers’ collection efforts.390  Because the Court had not entered a final 
decree distributing the funds resulting from the enforcement of the 
judgment, the officers had no right to the funds and had to return the money 
to the court registry.391  Unless “rights of others in the property condemned 
have accrued,” the pardon operated to nullify the forfeiture.392  Evidently, 
the district court’s judgment and the execution of the judgment were not 
sufficient for the officers’ rights to “accrue.”  A subsequent judicial order 
to distribute the proceeds was necessary for the officers’ accrual of 
rights.393 
Much more so than the Confiscation Cases, Osborn has parallels to the 
popular action context.  Because both officers and popular prosecutors 
must make concrete efforts to recover fines and forfeitures, the Court’s 
rationale for why the officers could not keep fines might apply to popular 
prosecutors as well.  Once again, the Court’s rationale suggests that, until 
the popular prosecutors actually receive their portion of a fine or forfeiture, 
their rights to the funds are not absolute. 
Finally, in Knote v. United States,394 the Supreme Court concluded 
(albeit in dicta) that “[t]he property and the proceeds [of a judgment] are 
not considered as so absolutely vesting in third parties or in the United 
States as to be unaffected by the pardon until they have passed out of the 
jurisdiction of the [judicial] officer or tribunal.”395  This expansive 
language, though once again uttered outside the context of a popular 
prosecution, bespeaks of a broad presidential power of termination of 
private interests.  The underlying rationale is that the president may 
exercise the pardon power to pardon an offense against the United States so 
long as he does not affect the property of third parties, such as those 
informers who had already received their portion of the fines and 
forfeitures. 
Taken together, the logic of these cases suggests that the qui tam 
relator has no right to fines until she actually receives them pursuant to a 
final judicial decree distributing the funds.  Commencement of the suit is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the relator to be entitled to a 
portion of the fine.  Hence, even after the relator commences the suit, the 
president may pardon or perhaps take the lesser step of entering a nolle 
prosequi before the court.  Similarly, judgment might be a necessary but 
 
 390 Id. at 477. 
 391 Id. at 479. 
 392 Id. at 477. 
 393 See id. at 479 (“[U]ntil a decree of distribution is made and enforced, the summary 
power of the court to compel restitution remains intact.”). 
 394 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877). 
 395 Id. at 154. 
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not sufficient condition for the relator’s unconditional right to a share of the 
fine.  Only actual receipt of her share, pursuant to a post-judgment judicial 
decree, would preclude a presidential pardon from obliterating the entire 
fine or forfeiture.396 
English and American case law suggests a broad power of executive 
control over popular actions.  English case law indicates that the president 
may pardon the government’s portion of the fine at any time.  English cases 
involving informations in particular go further and permit the executive to 
preclude recovery of even the prosecutor’s share of the fine or forfeiture.  
Finally, Supreme Court cases suggest that the president may remit an 
informer’s interest in a fine or forfeiture at any time prior to receipt of the 
funds pursuant to postjudgment judicial decree distributing the funds 
collected.  Though these cases involved nonprosecuting informers, the ratio 
decendi of those cases suggest that the popular prosecutor’s interest can be 
extinguished by the president until the popular prosecutor receives her 
portion of the fine or forfeiture.397 
C. The Proper Relationship Between Popular Prosecutors and the Chief 
Prosecutor 
Because acceptance of a presidential termination power over popular 
actions may change the legal status quo (or at least people’s perception of 
 
 396 Following the qui tam line of British cases, a few lower courts had earlier 
concluded that a president could not affect the relator’s portion of a fine once the relator 
commenced the suit.  In United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1336 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1822) (No. 
15,816), Justice Henry Livingston, while riding on circuit, observed in dicta that “[i]t may 
also be the case in a qui tam action, that a pardon does not discharge that portion of the 
penalty which goes to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 1344.  And in United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 
361 (D. Or. 1885), the district court in Oregon refused to allow the United States to settle a 
claim when the suit had been originated by a qui tam relator.  Evidently the relator had spent 
a good deal of money and time prosecuting the case and the government’s proposed 
settlement was for pennies on the dollar.  Id. at 363, 366.  Citing Blackstone, the district 
court claimed that, once the relator had commenced his suit, neither the secretary of treasury 
nor the president could interfere with the relator’s portion of the fine.  Id. at 364.  An 
Opinion of Attorneys General of the United States concluded that the president could 
pardon away fines to be paid to third parties where the third parties are not parties to the 
suit.  5 Op. Att’y Gen. 579, 586-87 (1852).  Attorney General Crittenden distinguished 
seemingly contrary British practice as based on a system where the Parliament could alter 
the crown’s rights.  Id. at 587.  In the United States, by contrast, the president’s powers were 
fixed by the Constitution.  Id.  In the course of his opinion, however, Crittenden asserted 
that a qui tam relator’s suit stood on different grounds because, he claimed, such suits were 
the prosecutions of private parties and not suits of the United States.  Id. at 586. 
 397 Of course, one might fairly charge that opinions written in the wake of the Civil 
War, almost a century after the Constitution’s ratification, hardly illuminate the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  These opinions are interesting, nonetheless, for they cast 
doubt on the claim that independent popular actions have been regarded as constitutional for 
at least two hundred years.  The rationale of these cases suggest that the antebellum 
Supreme Court might well have regarded independent popular actions as an unconstitutional 
infringement of presidential power. 
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it), it seems useful to discuss the effect a termination power would have on 
various institutions and actors.  It also seems worthwhile to discusses limits 
on presidential control of popular prosecutors. 
1. The Effect of Presidential Control 
Some might suppose that a presidential power of termination will 
sound the death knell of popular prosecutions.  Who will put the effort into 
investigating and prosecuting some alleged lawbreakers if the president has 
the ability to render these efforts useless by ending the prosecution?  If no 
popular actor would ever bring suit in a world where the president may 
terminate the prosecution, then a presidential termination power means that 
Congress has no meaningful power to create popular actions. 
This view of the effects of a presidential termination power is too 
apocalyptic.  It is true that if one actually moved from a regime of 
absolutely no executive intervention in popular prosecutions to a regime of 
presidential control of popular actions, the total number of popular actions 
likely would decline because the expected value of acting as a popular 
prosecutor would decrease.  But the current popular prosecutorial regime 
already permits a level of presidential intervention.  In fact, the executive 
branch (through the attorney general) has a good deal of control over qui 
tam actions brought under the False Claims Act. 
Clearly, popular prosecutors prefer a regime that preclude the president 
(or anyone else) from rendering their efforts a waste of time; they would 
prefer a regime were they win and collect every time.  Nonetheless, popular 
prosecutors will continue to bring suits when the expected value of their 
prosecution exceeds the costs of their investigation and prosecution.  Under 
the right circumstances, popular prosecutors can still expect net positive 
benefits, even if the president has the right to terminate their action.  As 
noted earlier, popular prosecutors will have to factor their expected costs of 
investigating and prosecuting and the chance of recovering a fine or 
forfeiture.  Factoring into the last calculation will be the chance of 
succeeding in court and the chance that the executive will terminate the 
suit.  So long as popular prosecutors are aware of the possibility of 
presidential intervention, they will consider that risk in deciding whether to 
pursue a case. 
If it becomes obvious that popular prosecutors lack sufficient 
incentives to prosecute (a possibility even in a world without presidential 
control), Congress can take any number of measures to increase the 
expected value of popular prosecutions.  Because the president has no 
constitutional authority over the allocation of funds (other than having to 
expend appropriations), nothing prevents Congress from further 
incentivizing the class of potential popular prosecutors.  For instance, 
Congress might grant a greater portion of a fine to a successful popular 
prosecutor.  Alternatively, Congress could keep the popular prosecutor’s 
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share fixed while increasing the total fines payable, thereby increasing the 
expected private value of a suit.  Congress could agree to share the costs of 
a successful popular action.  Or Congress might agree to pay a bounty to 
popular prosecutors for bringing a suit, whether or not the prosecution is 
ultimately successful.  As should be obvious, a presidential termination 
power need not necessarily render popular actions impracticable. 
a. Effect on Those Popularly Prosecuted 
The effect on the class of potential prosecution targets (which includes 
the entire population of the United States) is ambiguous.  In some ways the 
popularly prosecuted are better off.  Defendants may convince the president 
to terminate a costly and improper prosecution.  In response to a claim of 
innocence, the president may pardon the target of the prosecution, thereby 
terminating the prosecution’s deleterious effects on the defendant.  At the 
very least, the president might nol-pros the popular prosecution; though not 
as advantageous, it does at least delay any prosecution. 
In another way, potential defendants might be worse off.  Some 
popular prosecutors will be resource poor or perhaps represented by 
incompetent lawyers.  Defendants might welcome the prospect of battling 
such prosecutors, knowing that if they are acquitted, the executive branch 
cannot prosecute them once again because of the rule against double 
jeopardy.  A faithful chief executive ought to terminate such weak suits and 
order his official prosecutors to bring a new suit to vindicate the law.  The 
official prosecutors are likely to be resource rich and may be superior to the 
average lawyer that might prosecute on behalf of a popular prosecutor.  
Given that one cannot say which effect will dominate, a presidential 
termination power has ambiguous effects on the popular prosecutor.398 
b. Effect on Congress 
When Congresses created or modified popular actions, some members 
might have favored popular actions precisely because they hoped that there 
would be no presidential control.  If, over time, the executive branch had 
proven a poor executor of a particular law, “privatizing” federal law 
execution might have seemed a useful means of bypassing a sluggish 
executive.  Obviously, if the Constitution permits the president to terminate 
popular prosecutions of federal law, then such expectations might be 
dashed. 
Yet, frustrated expectations do not increase the powers of Congress.  
Although we might speculate about what statutes Congress would have 
 
 398 Because potential defendants do not have a right to incompetent prosecutors, 
however, they have no cause for constitutional complaint.  So, whether defendants are better 
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enacted had it understood that the Constitution grants the president the 
power to terminate popular prosecutions and although we will have to 
judge whether existing popular actions actually were meant to permit 
presidential termination, such speculation is irrelevant with respect to the 
constitutionality of independent popular actions.399 
In any event, once Congress understands that the president may 
terminate popular actions, it will make new decisions about popular actions 
that reflect the Constitution’s allocation of power.  Going forward, there 
should not be any dashed expectations. 
c. Effect on the President 
As noted earlier, while the executive power grants the president power 
to execute the law, the Faithful Execution Clause imposes a duty of faithful 
law execution.  Hence, the president must meet the soft requirement of 
faithful execution, even when it comes to popular actions.  To ensure 
knowledge of possible unfaithful law execution or to help ensure adherence 
to executive branch law enforcement policy, perhaps the executive could 
institute a more detailed version of the notice qui tam relators are required 
to provide to the government under the False Claim Act.400  While such 
notice might initially uncover many problematic suits (as a percentage of 
the total number of popular actions), the number of problematic suits would 
likely decline over time as popular prosecutors adjusted to the changed 
environment.  As the executive became more involved in controlling 
popular actions, we would expect that popular prosecutors would stop 
bringing suits that are likely to be halted by the executive, for few popular 
prosecutors knowingly would incur expenses with no expectation of profit.  
Indeed, with the passage of time, we might see very few exercises of 
executive control because popular prosecutors will adapt to the executive’s 
preferences and only bring cases that prosecutors believe will not invite 
executive termination. 
Does the Faithful Execution Clause require the president to 
micromanage every aspect of every popular prosecution?  As with official 
prosecutions, the answer is no.  Neither the president nor his assistants 
 
 399 Even if it could be said that Congress would not have passed popular actions had it 
known that independent popular actions were unconstitutional, severing the popular actions 
out of their statutes would not decrease executive control.  No existing federal law can be 
enforced by a popular action only.  In other words, executive officials may enforce every 
statute enforceable by private parties.  Given that the executive can already enforce every 
statute enforceable by popular prosecutors, it is not clear why Congress would have decided 
against the creation of popular actions in a world where only terminable popular actions are 
constitutional. 
 400 See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000) (requiring a copy of the 
complaint and disclosure of all relevant evidence to be supplied to the government by the 
relator before commencing the suit). 
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must monitor every pleading or argument made by a popular prosecutor.  
After setting some ground rules which might serve to notify popular 
prosecutors of his enforcement policies, the president is free to assume that 
most popular prosecutions will be trouble free.  Until he has some reason to 
believe otherwise (either from the information he receives from the popular 
prosecutor or from a complaint lodged by the prosecuted), he could grant 
popular prosecutors a measure of autonomy. 
If it became clear that particular popular prosecutors had repeatedly 
violated executive branch policy or had engaged in unfaithful law 
execution (say by prosecuting people who were innocent), the president 
conceivably could bar these popular prosecutors.  Though statutes creating 
popular actions sometimes read as if any and all may prosecute, the 
Constitution establishes that the president controls prosecution.  If a 
president is convinced that a particular popular prosecutor is unreliable, say 
because the popular prosecutor repeatedly harasses the innocent, perhaps 
the president can bar the popular prosecutor from representing the United 
States.  Just as the president can “remove” troublesome official 
prosecutors, perhaps he can remove or withdraw the prosecutorial authority 
of popular prosecutors.  To tolerate a popular prosecutor who has proven 
herself an unfaithful executor would be an affront to the president’s faithful 
execution duties. 
Could the president bar all popular prosecutions on the grounds that 
most popular prosecutions are unlikely to faithfully carry into execution 
either his policies or the law?  The better view is that the president cannot 
cast aside a whole species of law enforcement assistance on the grounds 
that he prefers a different resource structure.  Because the president must 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, the president probably cannot 
shun congressionally sanctioned resources that would help him carry into 
execution that duty.  Given that there will always be some private citizens 
who will bring prosecutions consistent with executive policy and that will 
help ensure faithful law execution, a one size fits all rule would not only be 
counterproductive, it might be unconstitutional.  Just as the president 
cannot dispense with the department of justice merely because he prefers a 
multimember commission of justice, so too, the president must refrain from 
spurning popular prosecutions as a whole, merely because he fears that 
some popular prosecutors will mount unfaithful prosecutions.  Instead, the 
president should target the unfaithful prosecutors, permitting the rest of the 
public to bring prosecutions. 
Presidents may not wholly welcome the ability to terminate popular 
prosecutions.  Currently, the public likely does not hold presidents 
responsible for popular actions because presidential control is regarded as 
limited (as in the case of the False Claims Act) or nonexistent.  A 
termination power, however, predictably will provoke termination 
applications.  A president will be held responsible for permitting suits to 
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continue and for ordering suits halted, decisions that will inevitably leave 
one party to the popular prosecution disappointed and perhaps angry.  
Whatever mixed feelings presidents may have about this additional 
responsibility, however, the Constitution is best read to empower the 
president to terminate popular prosecutions.  Given his duty to ensure a 
faithful law execution, the president should consider termination 
applications alleging unfaithful popular prosecutions. 
2. Constraints on Presidential Control of Popular Prosecution 
While the president has the constitutional power to terminate popular 
prosecutions, he does not have the constitutional right to prosecutorial 
resources.  Hence it seems clear that presidents lack the constitutional 
authority to direct private citizens to bring popular prosecutions.  Nothing 
in Article II conveys the power to compel private citizens to enforce the 
law, let alone prosecute federal offenses at their own expense.  For similar 
reasons, the president likely lacks constitutional power to direct a popular 
prosecution once commenced.  If the president believes that a popular 
prosecutor will be an unfaithful or inadequate prosecutor, the president may 
halt the prosecution and fulfill his faithful execution duties by directing an 
official prosecutor to file a new suit. 
But this just marks the limits of the president’s constitutional power; 
by statute, Congress may grant the president additional control.  For 
instance, Congress surely can provide that, as a condition of being able to 
sue for a portion of a fine or forfeiture, the popular prosecutor must follow 
the president’s prosecutorial instructions.  In other words, Congress can 
provide that the popular prosecutor take the good (the ability to collect 
fines when the prosecutor suffers no harm) with the bad (the potential for 
meddlesome executive control). 
Apart from possible statutory authorization for truly intrusive 
presidential control, presidents can always jawbone private citizens to 
follow executive prosecutorial wishes.  As a matter of what the 
Constitution authorizes, however, the chief executive’s options after the 
commencement of the popular action are to let it continue under the 
popular prosecutor’s control or to halt the popular prosecution. 
Conclusion 
The Constitution, as originally understood, made the president the 
constitutional prosecutor of all offenses against the United States.  
Consistent with English, colonial, and state practices, and in the absence of 
congressional authorization, early presidents assumed complete control 
over official prosecutors.  As Thomas Jefferson noted, presidents may 
order official prosecutors to commence or cease a prosecution because the 
president has the power to execute the law.  While a president’s control 
over popular prosecutions is not nearly as complete—he cannot order a 
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private party to bring a prosecution or direct its conduct once begun—
Jefferson’s logic suggests that a president may terminate popular 
prosecutions.  Indeed, constitutional text and structure, along with English 
and American case law, suggest that the chief executive has the ability to 
terminate popular prosecutions. 
In imposing a duty of faithful execution, the Constitution obliges the 
president to use his executive power to ensure that the laws are not mere 
pageantry.  Using the assistance that Congress supplies (the department of 
justice, popular prosecutors, White House staff, funds, etc.), the president 
should superintend official and popular prosecutors to ensure a faithful law 
execution.  While the president need not micromanage these prosecutors 
and review their every decision, he should stand ready to set things in a 
proper “legal train.” 
Although early history sheds little light on whether Congress can 
abridge the president’s control over prosecution, the better view is that the 
Constitution does not authorize the Congress to create independent 
prosecutors, of whatever sort.  Independent official prosecutors and 
independent popular prosecutors strike at the core of Article II’s grant of 
law execution authority and fly in the face of the founders’ choice of a 
unitary executive. 
Some two centuries after the Constitution’s creation, we continue 
debating the founders’ law enforcement choices.  Reasonable fears of 
presidential abuse have led many people to reject a system of presidential 
control.  Concentrating prosecutorial power in the president’s hands allows 
him to target his enemies and to shield himself and his disreputable friends.  
But, of course, wherever the power to prosecute rests, it may be abused.  
The institutional design question is: What prosecutorial scheme gives us 
the best mix of vigorous, uniform, responsible, and faithful law 
enforcement?  The choice is between a powerful president ultimately 
responsible to the country and to Congress or a reading of the Constitution 
in which Congress can grant prosecutorial independence to any government 
official and every Tom, Dick, and Mary. 
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